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Abstract  
This report reviews the implementation of Basel II, an international standard for 
banking regulations, in the Chinese banking system. In this report, I review the Basel 
Accords, including Basel I and Basel II, as well as conduct a detailed comparison and 
analysis of policy changes and their implications on international banking. Then, I 
summarize the evolution of the Chinese banking system with respect to its capital and the 
features of current Chinese banking system. Overall, the findings of the study show that 
the four important features of Chinese banks, namely, size and quality of assets, capital 
adequacy ratio, and profitability, have made great progress under Basel II standard 
compliance, particularly for state-owned commercial banks.  
Based on this analysis, I provide several recommendations. These 
recommendations focus mainly on the IRB Approach implementation for the Chinese 
banking system and a supervisory framework for the Chinese banking regulator.  
 
Keywords: Basel II; Chinese banking system; capital adequacy; three Pillars; the IRB 
Approach. 
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Glossary 
“A special 
purpose vehicle” 
 
 
 
 
 
Basel Committee 
on Banking 
Supervision  
 
 
 
Basel I 
 
 
 
 
 
A legal entity (usually a limited company of some type or, 
sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or 
temporary objectives. (abbreviation: SPV) SPVs are typically used 
by companies to isolate the firm from financial risk. A company will 
transfer assets to the SPV for management or use the SPV to finance 
a large project thereby achieving a narrow set of goals without 
putting the entire firm at risk. 
A committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established 
by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. 
It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities 
and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. (abbreviation: BCBS) 
The round of deliberations by central bankers from around the 
world. In 1988, the Basel Committee in Basel, Switzerland, 
published a set of minimal capital requirements for banks. This is 
also known as the 1988 Basel Accord.  
 
 
  
ix 
Basel II 
 
 
 
 
Bank for 
International 
Settlements 
 
 
 
Capital account 
liberalization 
 
Capital ratio 
China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
 
 
 
 
The second revision of the Basel Accords, which are 
recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This is also called 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (A Revised Framework). 
An international organization fosters international monetary and 
financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks. As its 
customers are central banks and international organizations, the BIS 
does not accept deposits from, or provide financial services to, 
private individuals or corporate entities. The BIS strongly advises 
caution against fraudulent schemes. (abbreviation: BIS) 
Free capital movements. It helps channel resources into their most 
productive uses, and thereby increases economic growth and 
welfare-nationally and internationally. 
The percentage of a bank’s capital to its risk weighted assets. 
An agency of China authorized by the State Council to regulate the 
Chinese banking sector. (abbreviation: CBRC) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
Fitch Ratings, 
Ltd. 
 
 
 
International 
Monetary Fund 
 
 
Market economy 
 
 
 
 
Moody’s Corp. 
 
 
 
Non-cumulative 
Preferred Stock 
 
 
An international credit rating agency was dual-headquartered in 
New York City and London. It was one of the three Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) designated 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975, together 
with Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
An international organization that oversees the global financial 
system by observing exchange rates and balance of payments, as 
well as offering financial and technical assistance when requested. 
(abbreviation: IMF) 
Also called a free market economy, free enterprise economy, is an 
economic system in which the production and distribution of goods 
and services takes place through the mechanism of free markets 
guided by a free price system rather than by the state in a planned 
economy. 
The holding company is for Moody’s Investors Service, which 
performs financial research and analysis on commercial and 
government entities. The company also ranks the credit-worthiness 
of borrowers using a standardized ratings scale. 
One type of preferred stock, of which dividend will not accumulate 
if it is unpaid. Under BIS rules, preferred stock must be non-
cumulative if it is to be included in Tier 1 capital. 
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OECD 
 
Planned economy 
 
 
Perpetual 
Preferred Stock 
 
 
Risk-weighted 
assets 
Securitization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A group has 30 member countries sharing a commitment to 
democratic government and the market economy. 
A centrally planned economy (or command economy), in which the 
state or government controls the factors of production and makes all 
decisions about their use and about the distribution of income. 
One type of preferred stock that has no fixed date on which invested 
capital will be returned to the shareholder, although there will 
always be redemption privileges held by the corporation. Most 
preferred stock is issued without a set redemption date. 
Banks will allocate risk weights for each asset based on its risk 
level. 
A bank sells its assets (e.g. loan) to a SPV, which finances this 
purchase through issuance of asset-backed securities (ABSs) to 
private investors. For bankruptcy, accounting and regulatory 
purposes, SPVs generally are treated as legally separate from the 
sponsoring bank; therefore, they are not consolidated into the 
sponsoring bank’s financial statements and regulatory reports. In 
many cases, a bank can treat securitized assets as true sales. The 
bank adds cash from this sale and removes the loan item from 
balance sheet, for accounting and regulatory purposes, even though 
the bank retains most of the underlying risks through credit 
enhancements it provides to the ABSs. From this, the bank can 
  
xii 
 
Standard & 
Poor’s Corp. 
 
Trading book 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank 
Group 
 
 
increase its capital ratio.  
A financial services company. Its products and services include 
credit ratings, equity research, S & P indices, funds, risk solutions, 
governance services, evaluations, and data services. 
A trading book that consists of positions in financial instruments and 
commodities held either with trading intent or in order to hedge 
other elements of the trading book. To be eligible for trading book 
capital treatment, financial instruments must be either free of any 
restrictive covenants on their tradability or able to be hedged 
completely. 
A group of five international organizations responsible for providing 
finance and advice to countries for the purposes of economic 
development and eliminating poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to conduct a review on the implementation of Basel 
II, an international standard for banking regulations, in the Chinese banking system. 
Basel II is the second revision of the Basel Accords, which consists of recommendations 
of banking laws and regulations, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
in 2004. Specifically, the regulatory framework of Basel II is divided into Three Pillars: 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process, and market discipline. To 
date, the degree to which the Chinese banking system has complied with Basel II has had 
significant benefits for the competitive advantage of Chinese banks in terms of following 
the progress and development of financial industry; maintaining the consistency of a 
market economic policy; reducing the gap of experience and technology; getting the 
support from IMF and World Bank; lowering the costs of raising money; and obtaining 
the opportunity for expanding businesses. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to 
identify the remaining challenges and problems faced by the Chinese banks and to 
provide recommendations regarding a more stable and faster process to prepare for 
complete implementation of Basel II.  
In this report, I will review the Basel Accords involving Basel I and Basel II as 
well as the Basel Committee. Based on Basel II’s four main improvements upon Basel I, 
I will conduct a detailed comparison and analysis of policy changes and their 
implications on international banking. Then, I will summarize the evolution of the 
Chinese banking system with respect to capital and the features of current Chinese 
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banking system, which also includes a review of the Chinese banks’ internal rating 
system. Finally, recommendations will be presented with an emphasis on the Internal 
Rating-Based Approach (IRB Approach). 
Overall, the findings of the study show that the three important features of 
Chinese banks, namely, size and quality of assets, capital adequacy ratio, and profitability, 
have made great progress under Basel II standard compliance, particularly for state-
owned commercial banks. State-owned commercial banks not only dominate the Chinese 
banking industry in terms of size of assets, but also rank ahead of other Chinese banks in 
capital adequacy ratio, quality of assets and profitability.  Realizing the rationale of 
implementing Basel II, the Chinese banking regulator and many banks have made 
significant efforts in preparation for a complete adoption of Basel II. As a new banking 
supervisory committee formed in 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Committee 
(CBRC) has seized the opportunity for Basel II implementation to further reform the 
Chinese banking industry. By the first quarter of 2009, CBRC had established a high-
level steering committee in the banking industry to promote Basel II implementation, 
released the first set of rules to all the banks, and finished the public consultation on the 
eight documents under the Basel II regulatory framework. Most importantly, the majority 
of Chinese banks have begun to abide actively by those policy guidelines and documents.  
However, a major gap still exists between the current status of the Chinese 
banking industry and the implementation requirements set by Basel II. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the biggest challenges of complying with the Three Pillars of Basel II that 
have resulted in CBRC’s duties being difficult to perform include the difficulties of 
adopting and implementing the IRB Approach, and the lack of inter-industry support. 
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Finally, it is hard for the Chinese banking industry to find a mechanism that facilitates a 
bank’s risk management ability to complete the bank’s obligation of fully implementing 
Basel II.  
To address the abovementioned challenges and problems, I have put forth several 
recommendations focusing on the IRB Approach and the supervisory framework, as 
outlined in Chapter 5 of the report. In order to fully adopt the IRB Approach, joint efforts 
should be made by all stakeholders within the Chinese banking industry. On one hand, 
individual banks need to improve their internal conditions, like designing a rating model 
and building a comprehensive and timely database. On the other hand, CBRC needs to 
increase efforts to establish the social credit rating system by combining with other 
functional departments. They also need to seek frequently more feedback from all the 
Chinese banks, and create an orderly financial environment that is fit for implementing 
Basel II. In terms of a supervisory review process, I introduce and adapt the Supervisory 
Framework revised by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, a 
primary regulator of the Canadian banking industry. Owing to the smooth operation of 
the Supervisory Framework under Basel II requirements since 2002, the framework can 
be readily adapted and applied to the Chinese banking industry.  
The adoption and implementation process of Basel II can be long and complex, 
especially for banks in developing countries. Nevertheless, the benefits of implementing 
Basel II in the long run will outweigh all the costs and efforts. The consequence of full 
Basel II standard compliance will undoubtedly turn the Chinese banking regulator, as 
well as the banks, into influential actors in international banking.  
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2 Background of the Basel Accords 
In this chapter, I will briefly introduce the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and Basel Accords (Basel I and Basel II), as well as analyze and 
summarize the differences between Basel I and Basel II. 
2.1 The Basel Committee 
BCBS (refer to Appendix A) is a standard setting body of banking supervisory 
authorities that was established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G10) 
countries in 1974. BCBS's members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States. Countries are represented by their central banks and also by 
the authorities with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking 
business. However, BCBS is not a supervisory organization of international banks with 
legal force. 
BCBS’s main contribution is the publication and continuous improvement of 
Basel I (1988 Basel Accord), which was issued in 1988. BCBS has also successfully 
enabled legal enforcement of the Accord in the G10 countries, while ensuring that the 
Accord is both well recognized and implemented by many non-G10 countries as a 
standard of effective banking supervision. In June 2004, a revised Basel Accord (Basel II) 
was issued called, “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
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Standards, a Revised Framework.” In June 2006, a comprehensive version of Basel II 
was issued (Refer to Appendix B). 
2.2 The Basel Accords 
2.2.1 Basel I 
In the mid-1980s, the effects of financial market liberalization, globalization and 
deregulation enhanced concerns about the long-term health of the banking system in 
many countries. The first concern was the effect of competition on bank profitability and 
capital building. The second reflected the changing nature of risks taken by banks. The 
final concern was the influence of regulatory capital requirements on the risk-taking 
decisions of banks.  
BCBS intended to set a standard that would help the active international banks 
effectively supervise their banking activities by requiring them to maintain a certain 
capital level. The most important innovation they came up with was the risk-based 
structure, which assigned different capital weights to a number of assets, both on- and 
off-balance sheets. This was intended to prevent banks from taking risk. However, the 
risk-based structure would inevitably introduce a new set of distortions to the decision-
making of banks because of its simple nature. Additionally, the fast growing innovations 
of new financial techniques by the international banking industry would bring new, 
unavoidable issues. 
In 1988, BCBS proposed a set of minimal capital requirements for banks, known as 
Basel I or the 1988 Basel Accord (refer to Appendix C). BCBS hoped to continuously 
review and improve the Accord based on its effects, as well from feedback regarding 
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issues such as raising capital ratios, promoting financial stability and taking off-balance 
sheet exposures into account in assessing capital adequacy. 
Basel I focused on credit risk, the risk of loss due to a debtor’s non-payment of a 
loan or other line of credit (either the principal or interest/coupon or both). It mainly 
addressed banking in the sense of deposit taking and lending. It required banks, 
especially those with an international presence, to hold capital equal to 8% of their risk-
weighted assets. The central part of this Accord consisted of capital and credit risk, with a 
requirement of: 
 
According to Basel I’s definition, a bank’s capital is comprised of two tiers. Tier 1 
(“core”) capital includes the book value of common stock, non-cumulative perpetual 
preferred stock and post-tax retained earnings. Tier 2 (“supplementary”) capital was 
recognized as lower quality. It included, based on various conditions, general loan loss 
reserves, long-term subordinated debt and cumulative and/or redeemable preferred stock. 
At most, Tier 2 capital could only compose 50% of a bank’s capital. 
Since 1988, this framework has been progressively introduced and enforced by 
law in G10 member countries. Most other countries, currently numbering over 100, have 
also adopted and utilized the prescribed principles under Basel I (Amswers.com, 2009). 
China also released “Regulation for Commercial Bank Capital Adequacy” in early 2004, 
which is based on Basel I.  
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2.2.2 Basel II 
BCBS has consulted with bank supervisors1 worldwide to improve Basel I based 
on its issues and weaknesses. This has led to a new standard, Basel II, or the New Basel 
Accord, introduced in June 2004. The purpose of Basel II is to improve the consistency 
of capital regulations and promote enhanced risk-management practices among large, 
internationally active banks.  
A. Improvement 
Several milestones between 1988 and 2004 have marked the continuing efforts of 
BCBS to enhance the regulatory policies and guidelines. In 1988, BCBS decided to 
introduce a capital measurement system called as the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), 
which requires the implementation of a credit risk measurement framework with a 
minimum capital standard of 8% by the end of 1992. In 1996, the market risk related to 
book trading was added to the capital requirement. In June 1999, BCBS issued a proposal 
for a revised Capital Adequacy Framework, which became the original draft of Basel II. 
BCBS presented a more concrete proposal on May 31, 2001, that reflected the comments 
of ongoing dialogue with the industry and supervisors from interested parties worldwide. 
Following extensive interaction with banks, industry groups and supervisory authorities 
which were not members of BCBS, the revised framework (Basel II) was finally issued 
on 26 June 2004 (BCBS, 2009d). 
 
 
                                                   
1
 A Banking Supervisor usually means the Central Bank of one country.  
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Table  2.1: The Evolution of the Basel Accords 
Time Actions 
July 1988 Basel I issued 
December 1992 Deadline for implementation 
January 1996 Incorporate market risk to the capital accord  
June 1999 First Consultative Package on Basel II 
January 2001 Second Consultative Paper 
April 2003 Third Consultative Paper 
June 2004 Basel II issued (updated to November 2005)  
June 2006 A Comprehensive Version of Basel II issued 
December 2006 Effective date of BASEL II 
Refer to Appendix B: Timeline of the Basel Accords Issued by BCBS 
B. Main Structure of Basel II (refer to Appendix D) 
There are three mutually reinforcing pillars in Basel II, which work together to 
help the financial system achieve safety and soundness (refer to Appendix E, G and H).  
The First Pillar: Minimum Capital Requirements 
This pillar sets out the minimum capital requirements that institutions will be 
required to meet to cover credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
The Second Pillar: Supervisory Review Process  
This pillar creates a new supervisory review process, which requires financial 
institutions to have their own internal systems to assess their capital needs. It also 
requires supervisors to evaluate an institution’s overall risk profile to ensure that adequate 
capital is held.  
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The Third Pillar: Market Discipline 
This pillar is designed to improve transparency by requiring financial institutions 
to publish certain details of their risks, capital and risk management (Out-law.com, 2008). 
2.2.3 Comparison 
A. The Biggest Change: the IRB Approach 
The IRB Approach is one of the core contents of Pillar 1, and is one of the main 
innovations and most influential changes in Basel II.  
This approach is based on four quantitative inputs (refer to Appendix E): 
• Probability of default (PD), which measures the likelihood that the borrower 
will default over a given time horizon; 
• Loss given default (LGD), which measures the proportion of the loan that will 
be lost if a default occurs;  
• Exposure at default (EAD), which for loan commitments measures the amount 
of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default occurs;  
• Maturity (M), which measures the remaining economic maturity of the loan.  
In addition to this, the IRB Approach has two editions: the foundation edition and 
the advanced edition, which are differentiated by these inputs. The different data inputs 
are summarized in Table 2.2, below:  
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Table 2.2: Input differences of foundation and advanced IRB Approaches 
 Data Input Foundation IRB A Advanced IRB A 
Probability of default 
(PD) 
Provided by bank based on 
own estimates 
Provided by bank based on 
own estimates 
Loss given default 
(LGD) 
Provided by regulatory 
authority 
Provided by bank based on 
own estimates 
Exposure at default 
(EAD) 
Provided by regulatory 
authority 
Provided by bank based on 
own estimates 
Maturity (M) Provided by regulatory 
authority 
Provided by bank based on 
own estimates  
Refer to Appendix E: Detailed Explanation of Basel II 
B. Other Main Differences  
Basel I is focused on a single risk, i.e. credit risk, while Basel II highlights mixed 
risk. It is comprised of credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Therefore, in terms of 
calculating the capital requirement, although the minimum requirement is the same at 8%, 
there is a capital / credit risk >= 8% in Basel I while there is capital / (credit risk + market 
risk + operational risk) >= 8% in Basel II. As a result, adopting Basel II is more 
conservative when calculating the capital adequacy ratio. 
Secondly, Basel II offers a variety of techniques in calculating capital adequacy 
rate. In Basel I, the only approach is to calculate the sum of risk-weighted asset values. 
However, Basel II provides more complex methods of risk calculation, including three 
choices for credit risk calculation: The Standardized Approach, Foundation Internal 
Rating-Based Approach, and Advanced IRB Approach; two methods for market risk 
calculation: The Standardized Approach and The Internal Models Approach; and finally 
three techniques for calculating operational risk, The Basic Indicator Approach, 
Standardized Approach and Internal Measurement Approach. Appendix F contains 
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detailed information about these measurement techniques. Therefore, Basel II has more 
flexibility and benefits in risk management. 
Third, the approach in Basel II has higher risk sensitivity. Although the 
standardized approach is the same in both Basel I and Basel II, Basel II allocates a risk-
weight to every asset and off-balance-sheet positions, while Basel I appoints one risk 
weight based on the broad category of borrower (i.e. banks or corporate). Therefore, 
Basel II analysis is more risk sensitive and is better for revealing the risks. Two common 
examples are presented in Appendices G and H.  
Finally, Basel II offers safer and broader coverage of banking regulation. Whereas 
Basel I concentrated on supervision, Basel II covers several integrated aspects including a 
bank’s internal methodologies, supervisory review, and market discipline. Clearly, Basel 
II has broader scope with respect to regulation. Thus, the result of implementing Basel II 
should make a banking system safer, sounder, and more efficient. 
The comparison of Basel I and II is summarized in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Comparison of Basel I and Basel II  
Basel I (Weaknesses) Basel II (Improvement upon Basel I) 
Focus on a single risk, credit risk  Broader contents include credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk 
One size fits all in calculating capital 
adequacy rate 
Menu of approaches and incentives for 
better risk management 
Broad-brush structure on risk measurement More risk sensitivity measurements 
Mainly depend on supervision of capital 
adequacy rate 
More emphasis on banks’ own internal 
methodologies, supervisory review, and 
market discipline 
Refer to Appendix E: Detailed Explanation of Basel II 
 
In conclusion, through the introduction and the analysis of the Basel Accords, it 
has been shown that Basel II has made great progress in risk scale calculation and 
regulation scope in comparison with Basel I. Basel II has developed a complicated 
methodology that needs lots of professional training and expertise to implement. 
However, Basel II is widely recognized and treated as an emerging trend of risk 
management in the banking industry.  
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3 Review of the Chinese Banking Industry 
Over the last few decades, People’s Bank of China (PBC) exercised the functions 
and powers of a central bank, in addition to handling both industrial and commercial 
credit and savings businesses. It was neither the central Chinese bank in the true sense, 
nor was it a commercial entity which conformed to the laws of the market economy. 
Since the start of the opening-up reform in 1979 however, China has carried out a series 
of significant reforms in its banking system, and strengthened its degree of openness to 
the outside world. Consequently, the finance industry has made steady developments 
since the reform began.  
In 1984, PBC stopped handling credit and savings businesses and began to 
formally exercise central bank functions and powers.  This was done by conducting 
macro-control and supervision over the nation’s banking system. The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was the major supplier of funds to China’s urban 
areas and manufacturing sector (Wikipedia, 2009a). The Bank of China (BOC) 
specialized in foreign-exchange transactions and trade finance (Wikipedia, 2009a). The 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) specialized in providing financing to China’s 
agricultural sector and offered wholesale and retail banking services to farmers, township 
and village enterprises and other rural institutions (Wikipedia, 2009a). The China 
Construction Bank (CCB) specialized in medium to long-term credit for long term 
specialized projects, such as infrastructure projects and urban housing development 
(Wikipedia, 2009a). The four of them were called the “Big Four” banks in China. In 1994, 
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the Big Four were converted into wholly state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and 
three policy banks2 were founded. The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) 
provides funds for agricultural development projects in rural areas. The China 
Development Bank (CDB) specializes in infrastructure financing. The China Import and 
Export Bank (Chexim) specializes in trade financing (Wikipedia, 2009a). In 1995, the 
Commercial Bank Law was promulgated. This set the stage for forming the commercial 
bank system and organizational structure, and provided a legal means for changing 
specialized state banks to SOCBs. Since the enactment of this statute, the organizational 
structure of the financial system has gradually improved. The state-owned commercial 
banks have been transformed into modern financial enterprises, handling currencies by 
capital injection. Over 120 shareholding medium- and small-sized commercial banks 
have been set up or reorganized, and both securities and insurance financial institutions 
have been further standardized and developed. In April 2003, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was formally established. Since then, a financial 
regulatory system has been created in which the CBRC, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) work in 
coordination, with each body having its own clearly defined responsibilities. 
In January 2004, soon after the second capital injection (see section 3.1 C below), 
the State Council decided that BOC and CCB would begin transforming the shareholding 
system3. The main tasks were to: 1) establish standardized corporate governance and 
internal system of rights and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements for 
                                                   
2
 Policy banks are banks which are responsible for financing economic and trade development and state-
invested projects. 
3
 The first capital injection happened in 1998. 
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modern commercial banks; 2) restructure the financial system to speed up the disposal of 
non-performing assets; and 3) reinforce the minimum capital requirement to build first-
class modern financial enterprises. At the present time, three of the Big Four banks, ABC 
being the exception, have fulfilled their reconstructions and completed listings. Since 
2007, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM) has joined the ranks of state-owned 
commercial banks. Thus, there are currently 5 SOCBs and 12 joint-stock commercial 
banks4 (JSCBs). They dominate the Chinese banking industry and are referred to as major 
Chinese commercial banks. Besides these major commercial banks, there are other 
medium- and small-sized financial institutions including city commercial banks (CCBs), 
rural commercial banks (RCBs), urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), rural credit 
cooperatives (RCCs), postal savings, foreign banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
Appendix I shows the map of the Chinese banking system. 
According to the statistics from CBRC, at the end of 2008, the total assets of 
banking industry were CNY 62,391.29 billion while total liabilities are CNY 58,601.56 
billion. The following table indicates the total assets and total liabilities of different levels 
of financial institutions.  
                                                   
4
 A joint-stock commercial bank was formerly used for a commercial bank (one that is a partnership); as 
opposed to a bank that is a public limited company.  
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Table 3.1: Total Assets & Total Liabilities of the Chinese Banking Institutions  
CNY Billion; % 
End of 2008 SOCBs JSCBs CCBs Others 
Total Assets 31,835.80 8,813.06 4,131.97 17,610.47 
YOY Change 13.7% 21.6% 23.7% 25.8% 
Market Share 51.0% 14.1% 6.6% 28.2% 
Total Liabilities 29,878.36 8,368.39 3,865.09 16,489.72 
YOY Change 13.0% 21,1% 22.6% 26.1% 
Market Share 51.0% 14.3% 6.6% 28.1% 
Source: CBRC, 2009c. 
Others include policy banks, RCBs, UCCs, RCCs, foreign banks, finance companies affiliated to enterprise 
groups, trust and investment companies, financial leasing companies, auto financing companies, money 
brokers and postal savings.  
3.1 Evolution of the Chinese Banking System by Capital 
A. The reform of the Chinese banking system 
In the mid 1980s, the Big Four were established as fully state-owned enterprises. 
At that time, capital was not clearly defined. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a banking 
system for middle and small joint stock commercial banks was established, while in 1991, 
Shenzhen Development Bank became the first Chinese bank to issue shares in order to 
raise capital in domestic stock markets. Subsequently, almost all banks in China started to 
pay more attention to capital and raise capital in the capital market.  
B. Laws and regulations governing bank capital  
On September 29, 1993, the Corporation Law was enacted, although it did not 
come into effect until July 1, 1994. This signalled the first time in Chinese history that 
capital requirements of a corporation were specified by law. Enacted in 1995, the 
Commercial Bank Law, the first banking law in China’s history, stated that the capital 
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adequacy for all banks must not be lower than 8%. This was not enforceable, however, as 
there were no specific rules for the requirement. In 1996, following the same approach as 
Basel I and Chinese Commercial Bank Law, PBC published an important regulation 
called “Asset Liability Ratios Management of Commercial Banks: Measurement, 
Controlling, Monitoring and Evaluation”.  
C. Capital injection efforts to increase the capital level 
In 1998, China’s Ministry of Finance issued special treasury bonds of CNY 270 
Billion for the first time, and injected them into the Big Four banks to recapitalize the 
banks up to the 8% capital adequacy ratio. The second wave started in December 2003 
with USD 22.5 Billion capital injections in the two best-performing SOCBs - CCB and 
BOC. The third wave occurred in April 2005 with the injection of USD 15 Billion into 
ICBC.  
D. Efforts to take over NPLs (non-performing loans) and commercialize the Big 
Four banks 
In 1995, the mandate of the Big Four banks was reduced and their policy lending 
business was transferred to three new policy banks, ADBC, Chexim, and CDB. In 1998, 
four asset management companies, solely owned by the Ministry of Finance, were 
established and they took over a total of CNY 1.4 Trillion (USD 168 Billion) worth of 
NPLs from the Big Four banks. By then, BOC and ICBC had started planning to become 
listed banks. 
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E. Financial liberalization effort 
Financial liberalization is another important element of bank reform in China to 
reduce government intervention in the banking system by introducing market practices, 
freeing interest rates, opening up to foreign competition, and liberalizing both exchange 
rates and capital accounts. For example, a crucial milestone in the financial liberalization 
process was the conclusion of negotiations for China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization in late 2001. The commitments agreed upon under the WTO led to the full 
opening up of the Chinese banking system to foreign affiliates by the end of 2006.  
F. Regulation and supervision improvement 
Bank restructuring and liberalization measures have been accompanied by 
improvements in regulation. In 1995, capital adequacy requirements were introduced in 
all commercial banks, as wells as ratios such as the loan to deposit or assets, and assets to 
liquid liabilities. In 2002, PBC established the international five-tier loan classification, 
although it was not made compulsory. With the establishment of the CBRC in 2003, 
supervision has significantly improved through managing of asset quality, capital 
adequacy, and general supervisory matters. The five-tier loan classification system was in 
place and fully enforced in all banks by the end of 2005. In early 2004, the “Regulation 
on Commercial Bank Capital Adequacy” was released. It is based primarily on Basel I, 
and incorporates Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 of Basel II (Zhongyang Chen, 2004). Efforts have 
also been made to improve bank corporate governance through the creation of 
shareholder boards with external directors. Moreover, disclosure of information is 
required for all banks. This is particularly important for listed banks, which must go 
through an auditing process as well as the publication of more comprehensive balance 
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sheets and income statements. On February 1st, 2005, the “Internal Rating Methods of 
Commercial Banks” was put into effect, which was a big step towards reaching the IRB 
Approach requirement is set by Basel II.  
Based on the changes discussed, there were three main steps in the process of the 
reform of the Chinese banking system. First, the banking system was restructured by 
cleaning up the non-performing loans (NPLs)5 and injecting of public capital, especially 
in the Big Four banks. The second step was to liberalize the financial system through the 
gradual release of quantity and price controls, the opening-up of banks to foreign 
competition, and by moving towards capital account liberalization. The last step was to 
strengthen financial regulation and supervision, and make efforts to improve corporate 
governance and transparency. As a result, the Chinese banking system has made great 
progress. 
Based on the above-mentioned information, I summarize the key events in the 
following table. 
                                                   
5
 A non-performing loan is a loan that is in default or close to being in default. Many loans become non-
performing after being in default for 3 months, but this can depend on the contract terms. 
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Table 3.2: Timeline of Evolution for Capital item  
Time Events 
Mid 1980s capital was not clearly defined 
Late 1980s JSCB system established 
1991 the first bank issued shares in stock market 
July 1994 the Corporate Law took effect 
1995 the Commercial Bank Law enacted (capital adequacy must not be lower than 
8%); the Big Four banks transferred policy lending business to three new 
policy banks 
1998 China’s Ministry of Finance issued bonds CNY270 B and injected them into 
the Big Four banks; four asset management companies established and took 
over CNY1.4 T worth of NPLs from the Big Four banks 
2002 PBC published five-tier loan classification 
December 2003 USD 22.5 B injected in CCB and BOC 
January 2004 “Regulation on CB Capital Adequacy” was released, which was based on 
Basel I and Pillar 2 and 3 of Basel II 
February 2005  “Internal Rating Methods of CB” was issued 
April 2005 USD 15 B injected in ICBC 
December 2005 five-tier loan classification was enforced for all banks 
December 2006 fully opening up the Chinese banking industry 
Source: Zhongyang Chen, 2004. 
3.2 Features of Current Chinese Banking System 
According to Table 3.1, it is obvious that SOCBs and JSCBs are the biggest 
components in the Chinese banking industry. Some of these banks are on par with world-
class banks in terms of size of assets and capital, as well as quality of assets and 
profitability. However, most of the other banks do not meet Chinese average bank 
standards and are far below the standards of top global banks.  
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The following is the detailed analysis of the Chinese banking system in terms of 
size of assets, capital adequacy, quality of assets and profitability. In addition, there is a 
general review of the internal rating system of Chinese banks’. 
3.2.1 Size of Assets 
The assets of the Big Four banks (ICBC, ABC, BOC and CCB) are relatively 
large. At the end of 2006, ICBC was ranked the third largest bank in Asia in terms of size 
of total assets, trailing only two Japanese banks. Table 3.3 shows the recent development 
of total assets of major Chinese commercial banks with the world ranking in 2006. The 
high saving rates as well as the strict restriction of international capital transactions in 
China have assisted Chinese banks in increasing deposits, which are the main source of 
funding. Public and governmental capital injection, IPOs, and investments of foreign 
strategic banks or organizations have allowed Chinese banks to diversify their source of 
funding.  
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Table 3.3: Total Assets of Major Commercial Banks 
The Top 1000 World Banks  
2007 List (12/2006) 
Total Assets by 12/06 
(US$B) 
Year on year 
change (%) 
World 
Ranking 
Chinese SOCBs    
ICBC 961.6 16.3 20 
CCB 697.7 18.8 28 
ABC 684.3 12.0 29 
BOC 682.3 12.4 30 
BOCOM 220.2 20.8 69 
Chinese JSCBs    
China Merchants Bank 119.6 27.3 108 
China CITIC Bank 90.5 15.5 127 
China Minsheng Banking 89.7 25.7 129 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
88.3 20.2 134 
Industrial Bank 79.1 30.3 145 
Huaxia Bank 57.0 25.0 176 
Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
33.4 13.7 246 
China Zheshang Bank 4.7 67.6 793 
Bohai Bank 2.0 Na 962 
World Top 3 Banks    
UBS 1,963.87 16.3 1 
Barclays Bank 1,956.79 7.8 2 
BNP Paribas 1,896.94 14.5 3 
Source: The Banker, 2007. Among Chinese JSCBs, only nine of them listed in The Top 1000 World Banks 
2007 . 
3.2.2 Capital Adequacy 
According to Table 3.2, early in 1995, the Commercial Bank Law stated that 
capital adequacy for all banks should be no lower than 8%. In 1996, PBC published a 
regulation with specific rules of implementing minimum requirements for capital 
adequacy. CBRC established a regulation requiring commercial banks to keep the capital 
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adequacy ratio above 8% after January 1, 2007. It was reported that over 66% of Chinese 
banks had met that requirement at the end of 2006. The capital adequacy ratio has in fact 
increased dramatically in recent years, although by the end of 2006 one SOCB (ABC) 
and two JSCBs (China CITIC Bank and Shenzhen Development Bank) had not yet met 
the requirement. Table 3.4 illustrates this information in greater depth, and shows that all 
the five SOCBs fall within the list of Top 100 World Banks. Three of these banks are in 
the top 20 in terms of Tier 1 capital.  
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Table 3.4: Amounts of Tier 1 Capital and Capital Adequacy Ratios of Major 
Commercial Banks 
The Top 1000 World Banks 
2007 List (12/2006) 
Strength Tier 
One Capital 
(US$B) 
Year on year 
change (%) 
World 
Rating 
BIS Capital 
Ratio (%) 
Chinese SOCBs     
ICBC 59.2 80.8 7 12.58 
BOC 52.5 62.1 9 11.73 
CCB 42.3 16.2 14 12.11 
ABC 11.4 12.1 65 -17.56 
BOCOM 10.6 15.1 68 10.83 
Chinese JSCBs     
China Merchants Bank 6.8 123.3 101 11.40 
China CITIC Bank 4.0 45.8 159 2.84 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
3.0 58.6 190 9.30 
China Minsheng Banking 
Corp. 
2.4 20.7 229 8.12 
Industrial Bank 2.0 31.0 259 8.71 
Huaxia Bank 1.4 11.9 335 8.28 
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.8 26.5 474 3.71 
Bohai Bank 0.6 Na 589 62.62 
China Zheshang Bank 0.2 18.3 999 11.87 
World Top 3 Banks     
Bank of America   
Corp. 
91.07 23.0 1 11.88 
Citigroup 90.90 14.5 2 11.65 
HSBC 87.84 18.1 3 13.54 
Source: The Banker, 2007. 
3.2.3 Quality of Assets 
The asset quality of Chinese banks has improved a lot. According to a statistic 
from CBRC, the ratio of NPL to total loans of SOCBs (not including BOCOM) was 
20.36% at the end of 2003, which was much higher than that of other emerging markets. 
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For example, the ratio of NPL for Eastern Europe banks in 2003 was 9.1%. This number 
was even worse before the Chinese government started the restructuring in 1997.  
Through the reform, in particular by setting up four asset management companies 
to take over NPLs from the Big Four banks, almost all Chinese banks showed NPL to 
loan ratio improvement. According to the CBRC, by the end of 2006, the NPL to total 
loan ratio of the Big Four banks was 9.22% while that of 12 JSCBs was 2.81%, and the 
ratio of the total Chinese banks was 7.51% (CBRC, 2007a). The details are listed in Table 
3.5.  
In addition, by the end of 2008, the NPL ratio of five SOCBs had decreased to 
2.81%, for JSCBs it had dropped to 1.35%, and the total for all Chinese banks had 
reached a historical low of 2.45% (CBRC, 2009a).  
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Table 3.5: Quality of Assets of Major Commercial Banks 
The Top 1000 World Banks  
2007 List (12/2006) 
NPL To Total Loan (%) 
Chinese SOCBs  
BOCOM 2.53 
CCB 3.29 
ICBC 3.79 
BOC 4.04 
ABC 23.43 
Chinese JSCBs  
China Zheshang Bank 0.00 
Bohai Bank 0.01 
China Minsheng Banking Gorp. 1.23 
Industrial Bank 1.53 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 1.80 
China Merchants Bank 2.12 
China CITIC Bank 2.50 
Huaxia Bank 2.73 
Shenzhen Development Bank 7.98 
World Top 3 Banks (in terms of total assets)  
UBS 0.60 
Barclays Bank 1.80 
BNP Paribas 3.12 
Source: The Banker, 2007. 
3.2.4 Profitability 
In 2003, Chinese banks had 3.05% ROE (Return on Equity) and 0.14% ROA 
(Return on Asset). These ratios were much lower than international standards, for 
example, Eastern Europe banks had 13.57% ROE and 1.43% ROA. The main reason for 
low profitability was low asset quality at the time, resulting in a high level of default.  
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After a series of reforms, Chinese banks made significant progress in raising the 
ROA. This is summarized in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6: Profit and Indicators for Profitability of Major Commercial Banks 
The Top 1000 World 
Banks  
2007 List (12/2006) 
Pre-Tax Profit 
(US$M) 
Year on year 
change (%) 
Cost-to-
Income (%) 
ROA (%) 
Chinese SOCBs     
BOC 8,700 26.3 46.32 1.28 
CCB 8,416 18.7 Na 1.21 
BOCOM 2,229 35.5 47.66 1.01 
ICBC 9,229 21.4 36.3 0.96 
ABC 1,561 54.7 Na 0.23 
Chinese JSCBs     
China Zheshang Bank 52 187.3 Na 1.11 
China Merchants Bank 1,291 52.0 38.28 1.08 
China CITIC Bank 897 30.5 39.67 0.99 
Shanghai Pudong    
Development Bank 
773 39.1 Na 0.88 
Industrial Bank 646 43.0 Na 0.82 
Shenzhen Development  
Bank 
255 212.2 Na 0.77 
China Minsheng 
Banking 
682 25.6 58.74 0.76 
Huaxia Bank 309 20.4 Na 0.54 
Bohai Bank -31 Na Na -1.57 
World Top 3 Banks (in terms of total assets) 
UBS 12,019 12.4 69.77 0.61 
Barclays Bank 14,009 35.2 58.69 0.72 
BNP Paribas 13,921 25.5 61.07 0.73 
Source: The Banker, 2007. 
3.2.5 Chinese Banks’ Internal Rating System 
Adoption of an internal rating system is critical to implementing Basel II. Banks 
in China have put forth great efforts to improve their internal rating system and use 
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multiple rating mechanisms, such as their mechanism for company credit ratings, the 
lending risk classification mechanism, and the banks’ subsidiary and branches rating 
mechanism. However, these mechanisms are not well developed and have significant 
weaknesses compared to the internal rating system proposed by Basel II.  
Up until 2002, Chinese banks had complied with the requirements of the Treasury 
and PBC, and did not establish their own lending classification system to manage loans. 
As a result of review, transformations in the banking system took place. This occurred in 
three distinct phases: 
A. Before 1998, Chinese banks implemented “The Rules of the Finance and 
Insurance Corporate” issued by the Treasury in 1988. It classified loans into 
five different levels. The last three levels were also known as “One Delay 
Two Lose” or “Bad Loans” in the Chinese banking industry. 
B. Since May 1998, Chinese banks have started to implement “The Guide of 
Lending Risk Classification” issued by PBC. This guide sorted loans into to 
five tiers. It is also called the “Five Tier Classification”. 
C. Since January 2002, PBC has required all of the banks in China to implement 
“The Guide”. 
 
In conclusion, through improvement and development in a variety of areas, the 
Chinese banking system has made significant progress in many aspects including capital 
adequacy, NPL as well as profitability ratios. In comparison to this progress, the 
development of internal rating systems aspect lags far behind.  
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4 Implementation of Basel II in China 
In this Chapter, I explain the reasons that the Chinese banking system must 
implement Basel II and discuss the efforts of CBRC and the Chinese banks to adopt 
Basel II. Moreover, based on the current situation of the Chinese banking sector, I 
summarize the challenges for the Chinese banking sector to completely implement Basel 
II, which cover three Pillars and the IRB Approach.  
4.1 Rationale to Implementing Basel II 
Basel II is widely recognized as the future direction for risk management 
development. The implementation of Basel II will promote the development of banking 
supervisory technology, enhance the effectiveness of market discipline, and improve the 
security of the international banking system. Even though it is not required that Chinese 
banks to implement Basel II at this time, it still has profound implications for the Chinese 
banking industry.  
A. Enhancing the Competitive Advantage 
The IRB Approach is one of the main innovations of Basel II, which is used as a 
tool to calculate credit risk capital. Although BCBS assumes that the majority of banks 
will initially operate under the current standardized approach, many banks, especially the 
major international active banks, will switch to the IRB Approach in the near future. Thus, 
Chinese banks may attract much less capital in the market due to increased competitive 
pressure from banks that have adopted the more finely tuned IRB Approach and received 
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much more capital as result. Therefore, adoption of the IRB Approach will further 
enhance the existing competitive advantages of those internationally active banks. This 
may result in a trend toward consolidation, which means that some of the Chinese banks 
will be squeezed out of business by those major international active banks. This will 
further intensify the current trend of a strong increase in the proportion of foreign banks’ 
control of Chinese banks. 
B. Following the Progress and Development of Financial Industry 
Basel II is the “Bible” of the international banking industry. Most member 
countries and some non-member countries employ Basel II in the management of their 
international banking activities. Meanwhile, Basel II is the international criteria used by 
the banking authorities to evaluate the capital adequacy and the supervisory ability of 
international banks. If China does not initiate Basel II, it will not be able to keep up with 
the progress and development of the international financial industry and will miss 
opportunities to share its experience and knowledge. Furthermore, choosing not to adopt 
Basel II will put the Chinese banking industry in a disadvantageous situation in terms of 
competition and cooperation. The lack of regulatory measures, such as those dictated by 
Basel II, will also impede the objective of realizing sound financial surveillance in the 
Chinese banking industry. 
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C. Maintaining the Consistency of a Market Economic Policy 
Basel II reflects the basic rule of a market economy. After 1978, the Reform and 
Open Policy6 helped China to maintain an average of 8% GDP growth. Since 1992, 
China’s economic reforms have changed the country from a planned economy to a 
market economy. This change facilitated China’s economic growth and globalization 
process. China has been making a tremendous effort to build its global identity as a 
market economy. Basel II implementation in the Chinese banking industry is a key 
method by which many developed countries may evaluate the sincerity of China’s new 
market economic approach. Faced with important rule changes in the international 
financial industry, China should take advantage of this opportunity and implement Basel 
II. This would show China’s dedication to transforming its planned economy to a market 
economy. If implementation does not occur, it will damage the consistency and image of 
China’s economic policy and its contribution toward globalization progress; hence 
jeopardizing the promising future of China’s economic growth.  
D. Reducing the Gap of Experience and Technology 
Basel II is an important improvement that has combined financial mathematics, 
statistics, information technology theory, management theory, investment theory, 
probability theory, and other advanced theories. It represents new technological trends in 
risk management, such as effective internal control, cautious and reasonable risk taking, 
precise risk evaluation, and risk-sensitive capital surveillance. Not implementing Basel II 
                                                   
6
 Reform and Open policy was issued in December 1978. The Central committee of the Communist Party 
of China held a historic meeting in Beijing, at which two important decisions were made. One was to 
open the door of China to the outside world, and the other was to invigorate the national economy 
through reform. As it turned out, the meeting marked a new page in the annals of Chinese history. Since 
then, China has embarked on a gradual switch from the planned economy to what we call the socialist 
market economy. 
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will result in a new technological barrier between Chinese and international financial 
industries. China will lose a great opportunity to shorten the knowledge gap of risk 
management experience and technological expertise between Chinese financial experts 
and those from Western countries. China would do best to master this knowledge from 
practice and being included in the process.  
E. Getting the Support from IMF and World Bank 
Without adopting Basel II, China will not be in a favourable position to obtain 
economic aid and low interest loans from the IMF and the World Bank Group. The IMF 
and the World Bank Group have always been strong supporters of BCBS. The IMF 
normally uses the surveillance rules set by BCBS as the criteria and mechanism to 
evaluate the soundness of the financial environments of each country. Additionally, it 
often forces member countries to implement and abide by those rules. The World Bank 
Group also uses technological support projects to cajole their beneficiaries into 
implementing these rules; otherwise, the beneficiaries lose its assistance.  
F. Lowering the Costs of Raising Money  
If China fails to become Basel II compliant, costs to banks of raising money from 
international financial markets and of being listed in foreign stock exchanges will 
increase. This is because the international rating agencies evaluate international banks 
based on the rules set by Basel II. Banks, companies, and other organizations from non-
member countries, including China, will get much lower ratings than those from member 
countries, due to their failure to implement Basel II. International banks and investors 
tend to believe that the risk level in China is much higher than in developed countries, 
and these investors will be reluctant to invest in Chinese banks or companies. For 
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example, in 2006 Chinese banks and security companies received evaluations ranging 
from BB+ to below B- according to the standard approach set by Basel II, so at the time it 
was difficult for them to raise money from foreign investors due to this designation as 
high-risk.  
G. Obtaining the Opportunity of Expending Businesses and Opening New Branches 
If China does not comply with the prerequisites of Basel II, Chinese banks will 
have trouble expanding business and opening new branches in developed countries. In 
order to open a new branch in a developed country, a bank must comply with Basel II, 
according to the requirements of the surveillance authorities of the host country. If the 
head office of a bank still uses Basel I, the operational costs and difficulties in managing 
risk will be increased.  
In conclusion, there is no doubt that China should implement Basel II in the near 
future. It would help China’s financial institutions enter into the global financial market, 
as well as effectively manage their risks.  
Therefore, understanding of the basic requirements of Basel II implementation is 
essential for the Chinese banking industry. 
4.2 Basic Requirements to Implement Basel II 
I will now summarize the following as the most fundamental requirements for 
banks to implement Basel II according to recommendations by IMF and World Bank in 
2005 (See Appendix J). 
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4.2.1 For Pillar 1 
In short, Basel II capital adequacy rules are based on a so-called “menu” approach. 
Banks and regulators are offered two distinct sets of options for computing credit risk 
capital charges: (I) Two standardized approaches based on external credit assessments; 
and (II) Two IRB Approaches that use internal ratings based on banks’ own data. For 
operational risk, banks and regulators can choose either: (I) the Basic Indicator Approach, 
based on overall income; (II) the Standardized Approach, based on income of business 
lines; or (III) the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), based on internal models, 
and using actual loss data. The minimum requirements for the advanced approaches are 
technically demanding and require extensive databases and more risk management 
techniques. 
Based on the above, four essential requirements have become concerns for the 
banking industry. First, banks should have their own meaningful differentiation of credit 
risk, and need to enhance the ability to provide supervisory estimates of LGD and EAD. 
Banks should also establish the necessary database and IT systems to ensure to produce 
the required data for calculating Basel II capital adequacy. Next, banks should set up an 
integrated internal rating system. Finally, the regulator should have the ability and 
capacity to qualify rating agencies and map agency scores. 
4.2.2 For Pillar 2 
The basic requirement here concerns supervisory ability and capacity. This means 
that supervisors need to make necessary assessments in terms of Basel II implementation. 
At the same time, Pillar 2 requires supervisors to establish an adequate legal and 
regulatory framework to support Basel II adoption. 
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4.2.3 For Pillar 3 
Pillar 3 first requires that the information systems of banks produce breakdowns 
to aid information disclosure. Building accounting and auditing systems are another core 
requirement of Pillar 3, which means that the systems should safeguard the accuracy of 
disclosures. In addition, those systems are required to have the ability to ensure 
disclosure, supervision and verification.  
After an overview of requirements, next step is to survey the efforts that Chinese 
regulator and banks have been making.  
4.3 Efforts Made by the Chinese Banking System 
As previously mentioned, CBRC was established in 2003 and is an agency of the 
Chinese government, authorized by the State Council to regulate the Chinese banking 
sector (Wikipedia, 2009b). In order to achieve the Chinese banking sector’s financial 
stability, facilitate financial innovation, establish a fair and orderly competition 
environment, as well as to improve Chinese banks’ international competitiveness, CBRC 
has several main functions in terms of regulatory activities (CBRC, 2009d). These 
functions are (a) formulating supervisory rules and regulations governing the banking 
institutions, (b) conducting on-site examination and off-site surveillance of the banking 
institutions, and (c) publishing statistics and reports of the overall banking industry in 
accordance with relevant regulations. CBRC focuses on consolidated supervision to 
assess, monitor and mitigate the overall risks of each banking institution as a legal entity; 
risk-based supervision and improvement of supervisory process and methods; and 
supervisory transparency in line with international standards and practices (CBRC, 
2009d). 
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In early 2003, when BCBS was compiling comments on the third consultative 
paper on Basel II, Liu Ming Kang, Chairman of CBRC, on behalf of CBRC and the 
Chinese banking sector, to wrote a letter with comments on Basel II to Mr. Jaime 
Caruana, Chairman of BCBS. Since then, the Chinese regulator (CBRC) and banks have 
been engaged in completing the necessary preparation for fully adopting Basel II.  
4.3.1 Regulator’s Endeavour 
By October 2002, PBC had set up ICBC, CCB, BOC, CDB and China CITIC 
Bank, which varied in size, to participate in QIS37. Of these five banks, three were 
SOCBs, one was a policy bank and one was a JSCB. They represented the general 
condition of the Chinese banking industry, and also reflected the Chinese regulator’s 
positive attitude towards Basel II implementation in the near future. At the time, PBC 
was the Regulator of the Chinese banking industry.  
The first and most important act of the newly set up regulator, CBRC, was the 
letter that CBRC Chairman Liu Mingkang sent to BCBS Chairman Jaime Caruana on 
July 31, 2003. On behalf of CBRC, Chairman Liu showed his strong support for the 
objectives of Basel II and stated that Basel II is based on the conceptual advances in 
regulatory theories and emerging best practices for risk management in developed 
markets (CBRC, 2003). Also, Chairman Liu noted that due to Basel II, the risk 
management of Chinese banks had begun to evolve at an accelerated pace (CBRC, 2003). 
In addition, Chairman Liu pointed out that following extensive deliberation, 
Chinese banks would remain on Basel I for at least a few more years after the G10 
                                                   
7
 QIS3 means the Third Quantitative Impact Study of Basel II. QIS1 and QIS2 had been carried out in the 
earlier period of seeking comments for Basel II. 
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implementation date of 2006 (CBRC, 2003). However, in order to improve capital 
regulation, CBRC revised the existing capital rules and incorporated Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 
to enhance supervisory review and market discipline. CBRC also stressed that banks 
should improve their risk management beyond the narrow compliance with a minimum 
capital requirement. In addition, CBRC stated that all Chinese banks should start 
collecting the necessary data for both borrower and facility, which serve the basis for a 
more quantitative approach to measuring and managing credit risk. Over time, Chairman 
Liu expected that CBRC would consider using the IRB Approach to capital regulation 
when banks were ready. Accordingly, CBRC provides incentives for banks to improve 
their sophistication in risk management (CBRC, 2003).  
In an attachment to the letter, CBRC expressed some pertinent and meaningful 
comments including market conditions in non-G10 countries, risk sensitivity and 
treatment of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the possible adverse impact of 
Basel II on capital flows to developing economies (CBRC, 2003). This letter gave a 
rational reply to BCBS and the world in terms of whether Chinese banks implement 
Basel II and what the process is going on.  
On January 26, 2005, CBRC held a seminar on the construction of internal rating 
systems at commercial banks. The Vice Chairman of CBRC, Tang Shuangning addressed 
the seminar and encouraged major Chinese commercial banks to speed up their process in 
building up internal rating systems, thus improving their risk management capacity 
(CBRC, 2005). Vice Chairman Tang pointed out that it was a general trend for countries 
throughout the world to implement Basel II. In view of the Chinese banking realities, 
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CBRC adopted both a “Two-Step Approach”8 and a “Parallel System”9 for the 
implementation. Based on this approach, CBRC encouraged major Chinese commercial 
banks to quicken their pace in establishing a sound internal rating system and improving 
risk management capacity. When the conditions are ripe, CBRC will conduct capital 
regulation on well-prepared major commercial banks in line with the IRB Approach 
under Basel II (CBRC, 2005). 
On December 21, 2006, CBRC held a teleconference to plan the implementation 
of Basel II in domestic banks (CBRC, 2006). CBRC Chairman Liu delivered a speech 
and pointed out that the new CBRC guidelines(“The Guidelines”) for Basel II 
implementation by the Chinese banking industry, were about to be publicized. In The 
Guidelines, three directions were specifically stipulated, as follows (CBRC, 2006): 
A. Large Chinese commercial banks that have overseas operational entities and 
substantive international business are required to implement Basel II, while the small- 
and medium-sized Chinese commercial banks can choose to implement Basel II on a 
volunteer basis. 
B. Chinese commercial banks are requested to calculate capital requirements for 
credit risk with the IRB Approach, and this is especially recommended and encouraged to 
practice Advanced IRB Approach.  
                                                   
8
 Two-step approach means that CBRC continuously concentrated on the implementation of the 
“Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks” as well as encouraged major Chinese 
commercial banks to establish an internal rating system. 
9
 Parallel System refers to a system under which (in the future), well-prepared major commercial banks are 
subject to capital regulation in line with Basel II, while the other banks are subject to capital regulation 
in accordance with the “Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks”. 
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C. The large-sized Chinese commercial banks should implement Basel II from the 
end of 2010, and if could not meet the minimum requirements set by CBRC, they would 
be granted 3 years of graceful period after approval.  
On March 13, 2007, CBRC formally issued “The Guidelines on the 
Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China’s Banking Sector”. These Guidelines 
are formulated with a view to steadily pushing forward the adoption of Basel II in China 
and enhancing the effectiveness of the capital regulation, thus underpinning the stability 
of the Chinese banking system (CBRC, 2007b). The second section of “Objectives and 
Principles of Basel II implementation” indicated that considering current development 
status and external environment, the Chinese banking conditions had been not yet mature 
for all Chinese banks to implement fully Basel II (CBRC, 2007b). Therefore, CBRC 
brought out three principles for the Chinese banking sector to implement Basel II (CBRC, 
2007b). 
A. Banks in different size are subject to different capital regulation requirements. 
The detail information was mentioned in the teleconference of December 
2006.  
B. Implementation of Basel II by the Chinese banking sector should proceed 
gradually. Based on this step, CBRC allowed banks to move to Basel II at 
different periods of time, which is aimed at making sure banks are fully 
prepared for rather, than irrationally rushing into, implementation. This would 
ensure the effectiveness of Basel II adoption.  
C. Banks are permitted to meet Basel II standards step by step. In Basel II, there 
are many conditions stipulated for the use of the capital measurement 
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approach. However, it is a long-term process, and the standards are met 
gradually, rather than all at once. Therefore, banks must, based on their own 
situation, make an overall plan and meet the Basel II standards in a phased, 
well-sequenced manner. 
The Guidelines also mentioned a clear timeline for Basel II implementation 
(CBRC, 2007b). 
A. Before the end of 2008, CBRC will successively issue supervisory rules 
regarding Basel II implementation and make amendments to the existing 
capital regulation requirements by taking into account public opinions. 
B. CBRC will conduct QIS in 2009 so as to evaluate the impact of Basel II 
implementation on the capital adequacy of banks.  
C. Banks employing Basel II should start the implementation at the end of 2010. 
If by then, banks fail to meet the minimum requirements set by CBRC, they 
may postpone their implementation to 2013 with CBRC’s approval.  
D. Any bank which plans to adopt Basel II should make an official application to 
CBRC at least six months prior to the adoption. CBRC will start to accept 
such applications from the beginning of 2010.  
E. Other banks may propose an application for Basel II implementation after 
2011, by going through the same procedures as Basel II banks do. 
F. Other banks should be subject to the revised capital regulation requirements 
beginning at the end of 2010. If Basel II banks have not started Basel II 
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implementation by then, they will also be subject to the revised capital 
regulation requirements.  
Following these Guidelines, CBRC published “Guidelines on Operational Risk 
Management of Commercial Banks” in June 2007.  
In May 2008, CBRC established the High-Level Committee (HLC) to promote 
Basel II implementation in the Chinese banking industry. CBRC Chairman Liu headed 
this HLC, and other members were CBRC senior officials and senior executives of major 
Chinese commercial banks (CBRC, 2008a). 
In August 6, 2008, CBRC held the first HLC meeting. At this meeting, CBRC 
Basel II Research and Implementation Taskforce10 reported the general framework for the 
implementation and proposed a draft of five pieces of guidance for HLC to review 
(CBRC, 2008a). In addition, this meeting made it clear that the years 2008 and 2009 
would be a time of preparation for Basel II implementation, and that CBRC would start to 
process implementation applications of Chinese commercial bank starting in 2010. 
During the next the couple of years, both CBRC and Chinese commercial banks should 
fully understand the relationship between the three pillars of Basel II and ensure balanced 
implementation (CBRC, 2008a). 
In September 2008, CBRC announced that it had made significant progress in 
rule-making for Basel II implementation and released the first set of rules for Basel II 
implementation in China. The first set of rules consists of five sets of guidelines: “The 
Guidance on Classifying Credit Risk Exposure in Banking Book of Commercial Banks”; 
                                                   
10
 The Taskforce was established in May 2006, and its purpose was to assist Chinese banks in preparing 
for Basel II implementation.  
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“The Supervisory Guidance on Internal Rating System for Credit Risk of Commercial 
Banks”; “The Guidance on Regulatory Capital Measurement for Special Lending of 
Commercial Banks”; “The Guidance on Regulatory Capital Measurement for Credit Risk 
Mitigation of Commercial Banks” and “The Guidance on Regulatory Capital 
Measurement for Operational Risk of Commercial Banks” (CBRC, 2008c). This set of 
rules provided clear and practical prudential requirements. In addition, the announcement 
told that besides these five pieces of guidance, more rules would come by either the end 
of 2008 or the first half of 2009 (CBRC, 2008c). 
On December 11, 2008, CBRC announced that it was seeking public comments 
on eight documents under the framework of the Basel II rule-making initiative up until 
the end of 2008 (CBRC, 2008b). The eight documents included: (1) Supervisory 
Guidance-Internal Model Approach to Capital for Market Risk; (2) Supervisory 
Guidance-Interest Rate Risk on Banking Book; (3) Supervisory Guidance-Liquidity Risk 
Management; (4) Supervisory Guidance-Information Disclosure on Capital Adequacy 
Ratio; (5) Supervisory Guidance-Validation of AMA Approach; (6) Supervisory 
Guidance-Calculation of Capital Adequacy Ratio; (7) Supervisory Guidance-Regulatory 
Capital for Exposure in Asset Securitization; and (8) Supervisory Guidance-Supervisory 
Review for Capital Adequacy Ratio (CBRC, 2008b).  
On February 17, 2009, CBRC put out public notice that it was seeking comments 
on four Basel II documents, which were released for the purpose of seeking worldwide 
consultations by BCBS in January 2009. These papers were: (1) Principles for sound 
stress testing practices and supervision; (2) Revisions to Basel II market risk framework; 
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(3) Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book; and (4) 
Proposed enhancements to Basel II framework (CBRC, 2009b). 
The most recent action by CBRC is that it issued “Guidelines for the Supervision 
of the Internal Rating System for Credit Risk of Commercial Banks” and “Guidelines on 
the Categorization of Banking Book Credit Risk Exposures of Commercial Banks” in 
April 2009 (CBRC, 2009e).  
The following table is the timeline about the important events above-mentioned.  
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Table 4.1: The list of progress for CBRC in terms of Basel II Implementation  
Time Events 
October 2002 PBC organized ICBC, CCB, BOC, CDB and China CITIC Bank to participate 
QIS3. 
July 2003 CBRC Chairman Liu wrote a letter to BCBS Chairman Caruana in terms of the 
Chinese banking sector’s attitude to Basel II implementation. 
January 2005 In a seminar, CBRC Vice Chairman Tang encouraged major Chinese commercial 
banks to speed up their process in building up internal rating systems. 
May 2006 CBRC set up Basel II Research and Implementation Taskforce to assist Chinese 
banks in preparing for Basel II implementation. 
December 2006 CBRC held a teleconference for planning implementation of Basel II by domestic 
banks. 
March 2007 CBRC issued “The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by 
China’s Banking Sector”. 
June 2007 CBRC published “Guidelines on Operational Risk Management of Commercial 
Banks”. 
May 2008 CBRC established the High-level Committee (HLC) to promote Basel II 
implementation in the Chinese banking industry. 
August 2008 CBRC held the first HLC meeting. 
September 2008 CBRC released the first set of rules that included five “Guidelines” for Basel II 
implementation.  
December 2008 CBRC announced that seek public comments on eight documents under the 
framework of Basel II rule-making initiative. 
April 2009 CBRC issued “Guidelines for the Supervision of the Internal Rating System for 
Credit Risk of Commercial Banks” and “Guidelines on the Categorization of 
Banking Book Credit Risk Exposures of Commercial Banks”. 
 
4.3.2 Banks’ Efforts 
Most of the Chinese banks have paid close attention to the development of Basel 
II. Many of them had made great achievements, which are listed below: 
ICBC. With the QIS3 opportunity, it launched an overall internal rating project. It 
had finished its internal MIS integration and compiled a relatively satisfactory database.  
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BOC. In order to experiment in its Hong Kong Branch, it enlisted experts from 
overseas institutions to establish an internal rating system. It also enforced a twelve-tier 
loan quality classification system in Mainland China.  
CCB. Its risk rating system received approval by the Seminar’s evaluation as well 
as from Morgan Stanley and Standard & Poor’s operation tests, of which the model 
performance was higher than other Asian banks in the early stage.  
BOCOM. As a leader in JSCBs, it achieved solid progress in developing an 
internal rating system. 
China CITIC Bank and China Merchant Bank. They made positive progress in 
developing internal rating systems.  
According to the mentioned previously letter of July 2003, large-sized banks had 
launched ambitious projects to build a two-dimensional rating system in line with Basel 
II, while medium- and small-sized banks had been also actively introducing elements of 
Basel II in the best way they could (CBRC, 2003).  
In addition, the Chinese banking industry has held five international seminars 
about the IRB Approach of Basel II. On July 15, 2004, at the fifth seminar, CBRC Vice 
Chairman Tang announced that China had made some periodic achievements in building 
internal rating system in the Chinese banking industry.  
After CBRC was established, Chinese banks followed their regulator’s schedule 
and arrangements and consequently prepared for Basel II implementation. For example, 
according to “The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by 
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China’s Banking Sector”, which was issued in March 2007, Basel II banks11 were told to 
adopt Basel II and were required to complete the design of the plans by the end of 
October 2007 (CBRC, 2007b).  
4.4 Challenges in Implementing Basel II 
After the review of efforts of Chinese regulator and banks had made to implement 
Basel II, I will analyze and discuss the challenges in implementing Basel II, which 
includes three Pillars and the IRB Approach.  
4.4.1 For Pillar 1  
Challenge A: Meeting the Minimum Capital Requirement. 
Implementing Basel II will increase overall capital for the Chinese banking sector. 
According to QIS3 in 2002, the banks’ overall capital requirement increased 12% under 
the Standardized Approach. Five different sized Chinese banks, which represented 48% 
of total assets of all financial institutions in China, had participated QIS3. Under the 
Standardized Approach, the total risk-weighted assets of those five Chinese banks 
increased by 9.02%, whereas the contribution of credit risk is 5.19% and that of 
operational risk 3.83% (CBRC, 2003).  
Although Basel II contains a simplified approach as an alternative to the 
standardized approach for less developed markets, there will not be reduction in credit 
risk capital charge to offset new operational capital charge. Therefore, it will be 
                                                   
11
 Basel II banks referred to those large-sized banks with operational entities in other countries or regions 
(including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and with large proportion of international businesses. 
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unavoidable to increase overall capital for Chinese banks while implementing Basel II 
(CBRC, 2003). 
Challenge B: Charging Additional Capital for Operational Risk 
Banks and supervisors throughout the globe all believe that with the current state 
of techniques, operational risk is very difficult to measure. Besides adopting the standard 
approach, banks are required to charge additional capital for operational risk that is equal 
to a fixed percentage of average annual gross income over the previous three years. 
However, this is not risk sensitive, and not likely to provide the impetus for banks to 
measure and manage operational risk. Meanwhile, capital charge for operational risk also 
contributes to an increase of banks’ overall capital. 
Challenge C: Implementing Standard Approach 
Basel II provides different methods for calculating capital each for credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk (refer to Appendix F). The basic approach for each risk is 
the Standard Approach. However, it is still very difficult to adopt the Standard Approach 
for three risks. For example, Basel II requires that banks use risk weight for these assets, 
normally loans, based on the external ratings for credit risk. However, Chinese 
companies that are borrowers of these loans seldom have their own external ratings. In 
addition, the Chinese regulator currently has no capacity to qualify external rating 
agencies to provide agency ratings. Therefore, banks often give 100% risk weight to 
those companies when banks judge their external ratings to be unreliable. There is not 
enough risk sensitivity reflected in this calculation.  
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In addition, data collection and IT systems of banks are not sufficient to produce 
the required information to support banks to implement standardized methods. 
Meanwhile, banks need to strengthen their understanding of risks, including their own 
differentiation of credit risk, to adopt standard approaches.  
In summary, Chinese banks are not qualified to implement standardized methods.  
Challenge D: Adopting the IRB Approach 
Compared to the Standardized Approach, the IRB Approach has many more 
requirements. It not only requires that banks have very comprehensive risk management 
systems, but also requires that supervisors be capable of evaluating and monitoring these 
systems. At this time, based on the current Chinese banking environment, CBRC is not 
able to provide supervisory estimates of LGD and EAD, which are used in the initial 
assessment for the IRB Approach. In addition, Chinese banks run different levels of risk 
management that construct their internal rating systems based mainly on a five-category 
classification method. It is impossible for banks to evaluate PD and LGD with such rating 
systems. Furthermore, banks are not able to calculate capital requirements precisely with 
such a low level risk management system. 
General speaking, to implement the IRB Approach, Chinese banks face 
difficulties as follows. For external factors, one difficulty is that the lack of credit culture 
base in society could prevent the compiling of actual and effective data from borrowers 
for banks and regulators. For internal factors, Chinese banks’ low-level rating 
methodology makes it very difficult to achieve the IRB Approach requirements. As well, 
the limited application of rating results creates little incentive for banks to implement the 
IRB Approach.  
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Now, I will conduct a detailed analysis about the weaknesses of current internal 
rating system in China. 
The current rating method focuses too much on quantification and does not 
accurately reflect risks. The current method uses a formula or model, set by CBRC, to 
evaluate risk by applying a Scoring Method. The categories for rating and for the risk 
weight of each category are based on expert experience and certain financial ratios. 
Bankers assess ratings and give each category a score, add them together, and then 
determine rating levels based on the total score. This method is easy to apply; however, it 
has numerous weaknesses. These weaknesses are as follows.  
A. The Use of Historic Data 
The current model is based on past financial data, and is not a projection of the 
borrower’s future ability to repay their debt. Normally, borrowers are evaluated by banks 
according to the previous three years’ financial data and relative criteria; however, Basel 
II requires data from at least the last five years. Historic data can be used as the starting 
point of analysis, but not as a tool to reflect future trends. If the projection period is long, 
the historic data has relatively a low correlation with the future. Therefore, the use of 
historic data is not very reliable. 
B. The Fixed Risk Weightings 
The category and risk weightings lack reasonable foundations. These categories 
work as a whole, rather than individually. Banks should use statistical technology to find 
the correlation between these factors, rather than evaluate one category and then add 
them together. The purpose of correct statistical analysis is to avoid re-calculation of the 
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same factors repeatedly. More importantly, the same category has different impacts on 
borrowers that operate in different industries. Therefore, it is impossible to explain 
precisely the risk based on the fixed weight.  
C. Lack of Cash Flow Analysis 
The current model lacks an analysis and projection of cash flow. Cash flow is a 
core factor in the analysis of a borrower’s future ability to pay back the loan. The current 
model does not analyze and project the adequacy of cash flow; hence, it cannot reflect the 
borrower’s future ability to pay back the debt.  
D. Lack of Comparable Industry Analysis 
The financial markets in China lack analyses and financial studies of different 
industries. The position of the borrower within its own market is a key factor of credit 
risk. Although some commercial banks categorize the borrower according to the industry, 
there are not enough analyses of different industries. The rating category does not 
identify different characteristics of different industries, and the results of comparisons of 
companies from different industries are not reliable.  
E. Incomplete Database  
The database in Chinese banks should improve, as it is very important to check 
the correctness of rating criteria and the results of ratings by statistically analyzing PD 
and LGD of different borrowers based on historic data. However, in China, poor 
information technology and unsatisfactory data collection lead to a lack of preciseness of 
PD and LPD. The estimates of PD and LPD for a specific borrower need historic data 
such as default information, rating information, rating decision, rating changes, 
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information of loans and characteristics of the borrower. Yet, most Chinese banks have 
only very recently started their internal rating system, so the accumulated data does not 
satisfy Basel II’s rating requirement. 
F. The Limitation of Applying the Rating Results 
The application of the ratings results is limited. Currently, most commercial banks 
focus more on lending management, and they pay less attention to the credit rating 
system. Bank managers are not aware of the importance and necessity of an internal 
credit rating system. Managers believe that the credit rating system should only be used 
as a tool for lending decisions, rather than for asset pricing, reserve decision, economic 
capital calculation and other considerations.  
G. The Definition of Loss 
The definition of loss is not clear. Normally, banks should clearly define loss first, 
and then rate the borrower. Foreign banks define loss from PD and LGD, while China’s 
banks define loss as the probability of paying back the principle and interest. Chinese 
banks’ definition of loss is too general and does not precisely describe the loss. This is a 
key barrier for Chinese internal credit rating system.  
H. The Objective of the Rating System 
Chinese banks only consider current and potential clients as the objective of rating, 
and do not consider the risk level of the loan itself. International banks normally adopt 
two level rating systems, to evaluate both the client and the specific loan.  
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I. Low Risk Sensitivity of Rating System 
Currently, Chinese banks use a method of five-tier classification to assess loans. 
With the use of this method, loans are classified very generally, and risk characteristics 
are not clear. This general classification has relatively lower risk sensitivity and does not 
effectively control risk levels of specific loans. 
In brief, Chinese banks will encounter many difficulties from the external and the 
internal while implementing the IRB Approach. 
4.4.2 For Pillar 2 
Pillar 2 concerns requirements for supervisory review. The introduction of 
supervisory review by Basel II has significant implications for banking industry. It not 
only introduces supervisory review of banking authorities, but also encourages banks to 
operate cautiously.  
Challenge A: Adopting the Same Supervisory Methods 
Based on the purpose of Basel II, in order to create an equal competitive market 
environment, supervisors of different countries should implement same supervisory 
methods. Nevertheless, this requirement does not seem to recognize the banking market 
in non-G10 countries. For example, treatment of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) will reduce the risk sensitivity of Basel II. Empirical evidence from some G10 
countries suggests that most banks lending to SMEs benefit from a greater degree of 
diversification than those lending to larger corporations (CBRC, 2003). Such 
diversification in turn helps to reduce a bank’s exposure to the credit risk posed by SME 
lending and the amount of capital required. However, in the Chinese market, SMEs are 
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riskier, measured both in terms of the size of non-performing loans and default rate. 
Chinese banks and supervisors all accept that lending to SMEs is definitely riskier than 
lending to larger corporations. It is true that most of the lending to SMEs is secured. Yet, 
the collection of default SME loans is also more difficult in comparison to the collection 
of loans for large companies. A lower risk weight would compromise prudential 
regulation and discourage prudent lending behavior (CBRC, 2003).  
Therefore, this difficulty is related to whether to adopt Basel II, because 
implementing it in emerging markets would undoubtedly require deviation of some major 
provisions of Basel II (CBRC, 2003). 
Challenge B: The Support for Supervision 
The organizational system of supervision is not adequate. A lack of a consolidated 
supervisory database is one of the main reasons. Another reason relates to having no 
sufficient audit and accounting mechanisms that document and calculate financial health 
of banks under supervision. Briefly, CBRC needs more feedback while pushing banks to 
implement Basel II.  
4.4.3 For Pillar 3 
Pillar 3 addresses requirements for market discipline. This pillar is mainly 
concerned with establishment of a set of information disclosure rules, which enable 
market participants to understand related risk profiles and capital levels. The premise is 
that market discipline is effective in improving information disclosure levels, increasing 
transparency, and requiring banks to publish complete and correct information on time. 
Market participants can make sound decisions based on such disclosed information. The 
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main function of requirement of market discipline is to improve transparency and 
strengthen surveillance and stability.  
Recent years have witnessed great progress for Chinese banks in market 
disclosure. First, the number of the listed banks is increasing and they strictly abide 
information disclosure requirements according to the listed company. In addition, many 
banks, which remain unlisted in order to attract more clients and responsibility for 
shareholders, disclose their important information related to their financial and business 
status on their public websites. Clearly, Chinese banks have improved significantly their 
external information disclosure conditions.  
One challenge in implementing Pillar 3 is mainly for Chinese banks that are not 
listed banks. Although almost all of those banks post their information on websites, the 
content is not enough for market participants, especially with respect to some critical 
financial information. Another challenge is the consistency of standards in terms of 
statistics. Based on several tiers in the Chinese banking industry, there are many different 
statistical methods set by CBRC. Therefore, Chinese banks can only be compared within 
the same tier. 
Table 4.2 shows the summary of the challenges Chinese banks face while they 
implement Basel II. 
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Table 4.2: The summary of challenges and related results for Chinese banks 
Items Challenges Results 
Meeting the minimum 
capital requirement 
Charging additional 
capital for operational 
risk 
 
Chinese banks need to increase their overall capital. 
Implementing standard 
approach 
It is hard to adopt due to lack of reliable external 
rating, enough data collection and efficient IT system. 
Pillar 1 
Adopting the IRB 
Approach 
It is difficult to implement based on lack of credit 
culture base, current low-level rating methodology and 
limitation application of rating results.  
Adopting same 
supervisory methods 
For some specific points, implementing Basel II will 
compromise prudential regulation and discourage 
prudent lending behaviour. 
Pillar 2 
The support for 
supervision 
There is no enough feedback for regulator including 
lack of solid supervisory database and sufficient audit 
and accounting mechanisms. 
For other non-listed 
banks 
There is no enough information disclosed by non-
listed banks.  
Pillar 3 
The consistency of the 
statistic standard  
It is not easy to compare all Chinese banks that are due 
to different statistical methods for several tiers divided 
by different ownership systems. 
 
According to the above-mentioned information, we can draw a conclusion that “in 
view of the current development status and external environment, the Chinese banking 
conditions are not yet mature for all the banks in China to fully adopt Basel II” (CBRC, 
2007b). There are so many challenges as regards three Pillars. The Chinese banking 
industry still needs to make many efforts to improve. 
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5 Recommendations  
In this chapter, based on the challenges of Basel II implementation for the 
Chinese banking industry mentioned in previous section, I provide several 
recommendations with respect to the three Pillars.  
5.1 Pillar 1: Focusing on the IRB Approach 
In reality, CBRC has already recognized the importance of the IRB Approach to 
implementation, and required that Chinese banks should adopt the IRB Approach to 
calculate capital for credit risk, especially encouraging them to apply an advanced IRB 
Approach in the March 2007 Guidelines (CBRC, 2007b). In addition, CBRC provided 
several recommendations to Chinese banks for the IRB Approach implementation: (I) 
Improving risk measurement techniques; (II) Re-engineering business procedures, which 
means setting up sound operational processes and procedures together with 
organizational systems, and thereby ensuring an independent, fair and consistent outcome 
of internal ratings; and (III) Nourishing a risk-mitigation culture (CBRC, 2007b). In 
particular, CBRC indicated some key points about recommendation (I) (CBRC, 2007b): 
A. Chinese banks should accelerate the development of an internal rating system 
and risk measurement models based on the dimensions, structures, standards 
and approaches stipulated in Basel II.  
B. Chinese banks should develop risk measurement models to estimate credit risk 
and market risk of their own asset portfolios. At the same time, risk 
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measurement models should be reviewed and tested to improve prediction 
capability and stability of the models.  
C. Chinese banks should actively apply the quantitative risk results in their 
design of plans and strategies, measurement and management of risk 
exposures and improvement of reporting systems.  
Besides the above-mentioned recommendations by CBRC with which I am in 
complete agreement, I have the following two suggestions for CBRC:  
A. In the process of implementing Basel II, CBRC should improve its ability and 
capacity to qualify rating agencies to provide effective external credit 
assessments, which Chinese banks could use while adopting the transitional 
standard approach.  
B. In an attempt to nourish a risk-mitigation culture, CBRC should strengthen 
banks’ risk management consciousness and enhance public opinion by 
focusing on risks, which could assist Chinese banks to cultivate risk-control 
culture.  
5.2 Pillar 2: Focusing on a Supervisory Framework 
In this section, I recommend a supervisory framework to the Chinese banking 
system, which is based on the framework used by the Canadian banking regulator. 
Canada was one of the earliest countries to adopt Basel II. The Canadian banking 
industry has implemented Basel II for almost two years and the Supervisory Framework 
is well accepted.  
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The intention of this Supervisory Framework is not to restrict risk taking but 
rather to determine whether financial institutions identify, understand, and control the 
risks they assume. It believes that supervising an institution is a dynamic and continuous 
process requiring periodic updates of its business profile and an ongoing re-evaluation of 
its risks and risk management practices. A holistic understanding of an institution’s 
environment, industry, and business profile provides the context for assessing its risk 
profile. The exercise of sound judgment in identifying and assessing inherent risks in an 
institution is critical in providing a reliable reference point for the supervisory review 
process. The overall outcome of the risk assessment drives supervisory strategy and 
enforcement of formal corrective action. (OSFI, 1999)  
According to the components of overview of the risk assessment process, it 
include significant activities, inherent risk, quality of risk management, residual risk, 
direction of residual risk and risk matrix. The overall outline is called the Risk 
Assessment Summary (RAS), which is an executive summary that highlights an 
institution’s present financial condition, its prospective risk profile, key issues, and past 
supervisory findings. (OSFI, 1999)  
Based on those contents, the supervisory process is divided into the following six 
steps: Analysis, Planning, Action, Documentation, Reporting, and Follow-up (OSFI, 
1999). Table 5.1 lists the information in detail.  
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Table 5.1: Map of the Supervisory Process 
STEPS OUTPUT TIME REQUIREMENT 
1. Analysis 
(Understanding the 
institution and developing a 
risk profile) 
• Risk Matrix 
• Risk Assessment 
Summary (RAS) 
• Every three months for 
sound institutions  
• Every month for 
institutions with existing 
destabilization. 
2. Planning 
(Scheduling and planning 
activities for the 
supervisory period) 
• Supervisory Plans (by 
Institution, Division, 
Group and Sector) 
• At the beginning of each 
fiscal year 
3. Action 
(Conducting on-site reviews 
and on-going monitoring) 
• Information requests • Quarterly visits for 
larger institutions 
4. Documentation 
(Preparing and filing 
information to support 
findings) 
• Section Notes 
• Working papers 
• No fixed requirement 
 
5. Reporting 
(Report of findings and 
recommendations to the 
institution) 
• Management Report 
• Updated RAS 
• Annually 
• No fixed requirement 
6. Follow-up of findings 
and recommendations. 
• Updated RAS • No fixed requirement 
Source: OSFI, 1999.  
In addition, CBRC should co-operate with other functional departments of the 
Chinese government to push the establishment of audit and accounting mechanisms, 
which could safeguard accuracy and validity of data from banks’ customers.  
5.3 Pillar 3: Some Thoughts  
The CBRC recommends that Chinese banks should put sound information 
disclosure policies in place, including information-disclosing methods for choosing 
contents as well as relative internal controls to ensure the appropriateness of the 
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disclosure. In addition, Chinese banks should disclose all the important information 
related to capital adequacy ratio calculation so as to facilitate the assessment by market 
participants on the prudence of capital measurement, thus enhancing the effectiveness of 
market discipline (CBRC, 2007b).  
From my understanding, Chinese banks also need to develop information systems 
to produce required breakdowns to aid information disclosure.  
To successfully implement Basel II, it is critical for both CBRC and Chinese 
banks to cultivate and maintain professionals in their institutions. Because of the 
comprehensive contents of Basel II, the involvement of professional talents is of great 
importance with regard to the development and the use of an internal risk management 
system. Therefore, Chinese banks and CBRC should recruit professionals through 
multiple channels, reinforce feasible and appropriate staff trainings at different levels, 
provide the practitioners a better understanding of Basel II, and expand the application 
scope of internal risk management system. 
 
In conclusion, being a crucial systematic project, Basel II implementation is 
technically complex and quite policy-oriented. Therefore, both the Chinese supervisor 
and bankers, particularly senior executives of banks, should have comprehensive 
understanding of the significance and implications of implementing Basel II and make 
joint efforts to be well prepared for Basel II implementation.  
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6 Conclusion 
The implementation of Basel II is inevitable in the Chinese banking system. The 
Chinese banking regulator and the banks have made great efforts to accelerate Basel II 
implementation. Although they have made some progress, there remains a relatively large 
gap between the current status of Chinese banks and the implementation status required 
by Basel II.  
Through an analysis of challenges faced by the Chinese banking system while 
implementing Basel II, I have made recommendations related to the IRB Approach to 
implementation and introduced a supervisory framework to the Chinese banking 
regulator.  
In short, it is clear that the Chinese banking regulator and banks are walking 
steadily toward complete Basel II adoption and that the Chinese banking industry will 
ultimately achieve the integrated implementation.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: About Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
A. The Origin  
BCBS was formed in response to the messy liquidation of a Frankfurt bank in 
1974. On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced the troubled Bank Herstatt into 
liquidation. One bank had released payment of DEM12 to Herstatt in Frankfurt in 
exchange for USD that delivered in New York. Because of time-zone differences, 
Herstatt ceased operations between the times of the respective payments. The 
counterparty bank did not receive its USD payments. This incident prompted the G-10 
nations to form BCBS to deal with cross-jurisdictional issues at the end of 1974, under 
the support of the Bank of International Settlements. 
B. The Objectives:  
1) Define roles of regulators (supervisors of different countries) in cross-
jurisdictional situations;  
2) Ensure that international banks or bank holding companies operating in other 
countries do not escape comprehensive supervision by a home regulatory 
authority;  
                                                   
12
 The Deutsche Mark (DEM, DM) or German Mark was the official currency of West Germany and, 
from 1990 onwards, unified Germany. 
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3) Promote uniform capital requirements so banks from different countries may 
compete with one another on a level playing field (Glyn Holton, 2009). 
C. Operation  
BCBS does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its 
decisions do not have legal force. Rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards and 
guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the expectation that individual 
authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements that are best 
suited to their own national systems, in either statutory form or otherwise (BCBS, 2009c). 
BCBS provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters and 
encourages contacts and cooperation between its members and other banking supervisory 
authorities. Contacts have been further strengthened by an International Conference of 
Banking Supervisors, which takes place every two years. BCBS circulates both published 
and unpublished papers to supervisors throughout the world, providing guidance on 
banking supervisory matters and promoting common understanding (BCBS, 2009c). 
BCBS secretariat is located at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, 
Switzerland, and is staffed mainly by professional supervisors on temporary secondment 
from member institutions. In addition to undertaking the secretarial work for BCBS and 
its many expert sub-committees, it stands ready to give advice to supervisory authorities 
in all countries. 
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Appendix B: Timeline of the Basel Accords Issued by BCBS 
Part 1: Basel I and Market Risk Amendment (BCBS, 2009a) 
Time Official Documents 
March 1979 Basel Committee: Consolidated supervision of banks' international activities  
March 1986 Basel Committee: The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures: a 
supervisory perspective  
July 1988 Basel Committee: International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards (updated to April 1998); 
Basel Committee: Outcome of the consultative process on proposals for international 
convergence of capital measurement and capital standards. 
November 1991 Amendment of the Basel capital accord in respect of the inclusion of general 
provisions/general loan-loss reserves in capital  
April 1993 Basel Committee: Supervisory Recognition of Netting for Capital Adequacy Purposes  
July 1994 Amendment to the Capital Accord of July 1988; 
Basel Capital Accord: the treatment of the credit risk associated with certain off-
balance-sheet items  
December 1994 Basel Committee: Amendment to the 1988 Capital Accord Recognition of Collateral  
April 1995 Basel Capital Accord: treatment of potential exposure for off-balance-sheet items 
January 1996 Overview of the amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks; 
Supervisory framework for the use of “back testing” in conjunction with the internal 
models approach to market risk capital requirements; 
Modifications to the market risk amendment; 
Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks 
April 1996 Interpretation of the capital accord for the multilateral netting of forward value foreign 
exchange transactions 
April 1999 Capital requirements and bank behaviour: the impact of the Basel Accord 
November 2005 Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks 
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Part 2: Basel II new framework (BCBS, 2009b) 
Time Official Documents 
July 1988 International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards  
November 1999 Update on work on a New Capital Adequacy Framework  
January 2001 Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord - Second Consultative Paper (January 
2001) 
September 2001 Update on work on the New Basel Capital Accord  
April 2003 Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord - Third Consultative Paper 
January 2004 Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: a Revised Framework; 
Update on joint Basel Committee and International Organization of Securities 
Commission work on the prudential treatment of some trading book items  
April 2005 Trading Book Survey: A Summary of Responses  
November 2005 Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework  
March 2006 Use of vendor products in the Basel II IRB framework 
January 2006 Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version  
September 2006 The IRB Use Test: Background and Implementation 
October 2006 Risk weight for International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) 
October 2007 Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Default Risk in the Trading 
Book – consultative document 
July 2008 Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Risk in the Trading Book; 
Proposed revisions to the Basel II market risk framework. 
January 2009 Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework; 
Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book; 
Proposed enhancements to the Basel II framework. 
March 2009 Core principles for effective deposit insurance systems - consultative document 
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Appendix C: The Impact of Basel I 
This section is mainly based on the “Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: 
The Impact of the Basel Accord” (A working group led by Patricia Jackson, 1999).  
The impact and new problems are summarized as follows:  
Table C-1: Projected Goals and Unanticipated Results of Basel I  
Anticipated policy goals Unanticipated result 
Target 1. Growth of capital ratios 
for banks: 8% percent reserve target 
met or exceeded Minimum capital 
standard 
Recognition that regulatory avoidance techniques 
could proliferate. Capital arbitrage increased and 
the use of securitization diluted the 8 percent 
minimum standard 
Target 2. Creation of a level 
playing field for all international 
banks with a simple approach to 
credit risk 
Implementation varied. Securitization techniques 
contributed to greater inequity, benefiting banks in 
some countries more than others do.  
Target 3. Rein in off-balance-sheet 
exposure 
Legitimized off-balance-sheet lending and 
introduced new risk elements 
After the Accord was introduced in 1998, it became well recognized and enforced 
by both the member countries and some non-member countries, as well as becoming an 
accepted standard for supervising banking activities. Basel I had reshaped the global 
financial markets and accomplished the anticipated policy goals, though it also had 
encountered many unanticipated results. 
Based on Table C-1, the following are the detailed analysis of the impact. 
Target 1:  
As expected, the accord did a great deal to improve the capital levels in 
international banks that had been too low. According to a recent analysis (A working 
group led by Patricia Jackson, 1999), since the introduction of the Basel Accord in 1988, 
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the risk-based capital ratios in developed economies have increased significantly with the 
industry’s average capital ratio rising from 9.3% in 1988 to 11.2% in 1996. Although the 
data are not completely comparable across countries due to factors such as differing tax 
regimes, accounting standards, industrial and regulatory factors and cultural difference, it 
is clear that the introduction of the Basel capital adequacy ratios was followed by G-10 
countries. Furthermore, the fact that the ratios set by banking supervisors are normally 
higher than the Basel minimum, which is 8%, was another important condition to further 
improve the low capital ratio. However, there also have been some less positive features 
accompanying these accomplishments. Over time, the banks have learned how to exploit 
the broad nature of the requirements, especially the limited relationship between actual 
risk (economic capital) and the regulatory capital charge. The unanticipated growth of 
regulatory capital arbitrage techniques, such as securitization and cherry-picking13, and 
other not sufficiently recognized credit risk’s mitigation techniques, such as collateral and 
guarantees, have diluted the 8% minimum requirement.  
Regulatory capital arbitrage reflects banks’ efforts to meet the required capital 
ratio and keep their funds’ costs as low as possible. As the regulatory capital requirement 
has been in conflict with increasingly sophisticated internal measures of economic capital, 
banks have an incentive to use regulatory advantaged financial innovations to meet the 
capital requirement. Obviously, banks can increase capital ratios either by increasing the 
numerator (the level of regulatory capital) or by decreasing the denominator (total risk- 
weighted assets). Risk weighted assets can be decreased through a reduction in assets or 
                                                   
13
 Within a particular risk-weight category, such as 100% risk-weighted assets, cherry-picking is the practice of shifting 
the portfolio’s composition toward lower quality credits. For example, in order to boost its return on equity, a bank 
may decide to originate fewer BBB-rated loans in favour of more BB-rated loans. In this case, the bank’s total risk 
weighted assets and regulatory capital ratios would appear unchanged, even as its overall riskiness increased.  
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through a switch from higher to lower weighted assets and/ or capital arbitrage practices. 
Securitization is an example of these innovations, a by-product of the Accord that grew 
explosively since 1988. In March 1998, outstanding non-mortgage securitizations by the 
ten largest US bank holding companies amounted to around $200 billion, more than 25%, 
on average, of these banks’ risk-weighted loans. European banks have also been using the 
US markets for securitizations and there is also evidence that securitizations performed 
outside the US have been growing rapidly. Overall, therefore, with the increasing 
sophistication of the banks and the development of new innovative techniques in the 
market, the largest banks have started to find ways of avoiding the limitation which fixed 
capital requirements place on their risk-taking relative to their capital. For certain banks, 
this is undoubtedly starting to undermine the comparability and even the meaningfulness 
of the capital ratios maintained. 
Target 2:  
Although the Accord made an effort to create a level playing field for all 
international banks with a simple approach to credit risk and the 8% requirement of 
capital ratio, there were still large inequities due to different costs of capital, the 
accounting principles used, and other policies. Because the capital requirements are 
applied uniformly across a broad class of assets, banks have an incentive to substitute 
towards the riskier assets in the class (“Cherry-Picking”), leading to an overall rise in the 
riskiness of the banks’ assets. For example, as the risk weight for all corporate loans is 
100%, banks would like to own riskier corporate loans to gain more profit while keeping 
the risk weighted asset same. These are the principal reasons why the BCBS decided to 
propose a more risk-sensitive framework in June 1999. The degree of utilization of 
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cherry-picking technique among banks will create inequality among these banks. For 
example, as a “Special Purpose Vehicle” sells asset-backed securities to investors who 
are normally insured by banks with the high quality assets (loans), securitization 
techniques have given banks an incentive to move high quality assets off the balance 
sheet, thus reducing the average quality of bank loan portfolios. Variations in 
implementation of securitization by different countries added to additional inequities 
among banks, which benefited banks in some countries more than others. 
Target 3:  
The Accord’s greatest success was to rein in bank transactions that may not have 
been recorded on a balance sheet, such as derivatives and foreign exchange exposure. 
However, a policy promulgated to rein in off-balance-sheet bank lending created a 
regulatory environment ripe for new forms of this type of financing to flourish, such as 
securitizations. 
As a result, the 1988 Accord has led to two outcomes. One anticipated outcome is 
the growth of capital ratios and greater global financial stability. An unanticipated 
development is the growth of off-balance-sheet funding through securitization. 
Securitization transferred risk outside the traditional banking system, which is often 
viewed as a positive development. However, it also diluted the 8% capital requirement.  
In addition, Basel I only considered credit risk, rather than the increasing market 
risk and operation risk. Moreover, the risk weight for credit risk is too simple, which is 
arbitraged by banks through Cherry-Picking. Finally, Basel I did not consider market 
discipline and supervisory review. 
  
70 
Appendix D: Main Structure of Basel II 
 
Basel II Accord 
Pillar 1 
Minimum Capital 
Requirements 
Pillar 2 
Supervisory Review 
Process 
Pillar 3 
Market Discipline 
 
Credit Risk 
 
Operational Risk 
 
Market Risk 
Standard 
Approach 
Internal Rating 
Based Approach 
  
71 
Appendix E: Detailed Explanation of Basel II 
A. The First Pillar: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Pillar 1, the minimum capital requirement for banks, can be expressed as: 
 
 
Basel II calculates the capital requirement based on credit risk, market risk and 
operational risk, while Basel I is based on credit risk alone. Although Basel II maintains 
both the definition of capital and the minimum requirement at 8% of capital to risk 
weighted assets in Basel I, it makes a great improvement in measuring risks of assets. 
Basel II offers more complicated measurement methods for credit risk, proposes a 
measure for operational risk for the first time, and proposes the market risk measure that 
was first considered in 1996. Furthermore, banks have different options to calculate each 
risk based on their capability of risk management. (Refer to Appendix F) 
(a) Credit Risk  
To measure the credit risk, there are two main options, the Standard Approach, 
and the IRB Approach that includes foundation and advanced IRB. The use of the IRB 
Approach will be subject to approval by the supervisor, based on the standards set by the 
Basel committee.  
Option 1: Standardized Approach 
Although the Standardized Approach is the same as the present Accord from a 
conceptual point of view, it is more risk sensitive. Basel II allocates a risk-weight to each 
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of its assets and off-balance-sheet positions, while Basel I appoints a risk weight based on 
the broad category of borrower (i.e. sovereigns, banks or corporate). Under Basel II, the 
risk weights are defined by reference to a rating that is provided by an external credit 
rating agency, such as Dun & Bradstreet, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. For example, 
for corporate lending, Basel I provides only one risk weight category of 100% but Basel 
II will provide four categories (20%, 50%, 100% and 150%). The risk weight of the 
OECD countries is also differentiated in Basel II, while they have the same weight in 
Basel I.  
For example, a bank has two types of assets that have low ratings, $500 below 
BB- company bond (asset 1) and $500 Turkey government bond (asset 2). The total 
capital of this bank is at $40. 
Under Basel I, risk weighted assets= (asset 1* risk weight) + (asset 2* risk weight) 
= $500*100%+$500*0%=$500, while, under Basel II, risk weighted assets = (asset 1* 
risk weight) + (asset 2* risk weight) = $500*150%+$500*100%=$1250. (Risk weight 
refer to Appendix G and H) Therefore, capital ratio under Basel I = (capital/risk weighted 
assets)=$40/$500=8%, while, capital ratio under Basel II=$40/$1250=3.2% Conversely, 
a bank has two types of assets that have high ratings, $500 AA- company bond (asset 1’) 
and $500 Germany government bond (asset 2’). Under Basle I, the risk weighted 
asset=$500*100%+$500*0%=$500, while, under Basel II, the risk weighted 
asset=$500*20%=$100. Therefore, capital ratio under Basel I = (capital/risk weighted 
assets)=$40/$500=8%, while, capital ratio under Basel II=$40/$100=40%.   
In conclusion, Basel II is more risk sensitive. Under Basel II, banks with assets 
from low rated companies and countries will be worse off, while banks with assets from 
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high rated companies and countries will be better off. The consequence is that banks 
would like to lend money to these companies and countries that have high rating.  
Option 2: IRB Approach 
Four quantitative inputs and their differences of foundation and advanced IRB 
Approaches have been mentioned in Chapter 2.2.3.  
Utilizing the IRB Approach, banks will be permitted to use their internal 
estimates of borrower creditworthiness to assess credit risk in their portfolios, subject to 
strict methodological and disclosure standards. A bank estimates each borrower’s 
creditworthiness, and the results are translated into estimates of potential future losses, 
which form the basis of minimum capital requirements. The framework allows for both 
the IRB method and advanced IRB methodologies for corporate, sovereign and bank 
exposures. Different types of loan exposures will have different distinct analytical 
frameworks. For example, the loss characteristics of corporate and retail lending are 
different. Under both the basic and advanced IRB Approaches, the range of risk weights 
will be far more diverse than that in the standardized approach, resulting in greater risk 
sensitivity. 
Option 3: Securitization Framework 
Off-balance sheet lending and securitization are two main issues in Basel II. It 
introduces more risk sensitive approaches to the treatment of collateral, guarantees, credit 
derivatives, netting and securitization, under both the Standardized Approach and the 
IRB Approach.  
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(b) Operational Risk  
BCBS also has been making efforts to develop an appropriate capital charge for 
operational risk, such as the risk of loss from computer failures, poor documentation or 
fraud. BCBS expects operational risk to constitute approximately 20% of the overall 
capital requirements under the new framework on average. Many major banks now 
allocate 20% or more of their internal capital to operational risk. It will be important to 
collect sufficient loss data in the coming months to establish accurate calibration of the 
operational risk.  
There are also three approaches to measure operational risk, a basic indicator 
approach, a standardized approach, and an internal measurement approach. The basic 
indicator approach and standardized approach mainly calculate the capital charge for 
operation risk based on the standard set by Basel II. These two approaches require banks 
to charge roughly 20% of the total capital to cover their operation risk. The internal 
measurement approach, which is subject to satisfying minimum supervisory standards, is 
generated by the banks’ own operational risk measurement systems. 
BCBS’s ultimate goal is to ensure that the regulatory capital requirement is 
sufficient to address underlying risks and contains incentives for banks to migrate from 
the foundation approach to the IRB Approach. 
(c) Market Risk 
Although the overall capital requirement set by Basel I was intended to cover all 
risks, it set a capital requirement only in terms of credit risk. In 1996, market risk 
exposures were removed from the credit risk category and were given separate capital 
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charges. There are two approaches to measure market risk, a Standardized Approach and 
internal models approach. The Standardized Approach calculates risk based on the 
standard set by BCBS for each of equity risk (stock price change), interest risk (interest 
rate change), currency risk (foreign exchange rate change) and commodity risk (product 
price change), and then adds them together to get the total capital charge for market risk. 
The internal models approach calculates the total capital charge based on banks’ own 
measurement system, which is subject to satisfying minimum supervisory standards. 
B. The Second Pillar: Supervisory Review Process 
The supervisory review process requires supervisors to make sure that each bank 
has a sound internal rating system in place to assess the capital adequacy based on a 
comprehensive evaluation of its risks. Basel II stresses the importance of bank 
management by developing an internal capital assessment process and setting targets for 
capital that are appropriate with the bank’s particular risk profile and control environment. 
Supervisors would be responsible for evaluating how well banks are assessing their 
capital adequacy needs relative to their risks. This internal process would then be subject 
to supervisory review and intervention. 
The implementation of this review process will require much more detailed 
communications between supervisors and banks. This in turn has implications for the 
training and expertise of supervisors and banks.  
C. The Third Pillar: Market Discipline 
Market discipline aims to enhance disclosure by banks. Effective disclosure is 
essential to ensure that market participants can better understand banks’ risk profiles and 
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the position of capital adequacy. Basel II sets out disclosure requirements and 
recommendations in several areas, including the way a bank calculates its capital 
adequacy, its risk assessment methods, and its scope of disclosure. The core set of 
disclosure recommendations focus on more detailed requirements for supervisory 
recognition of internal methodologies for credit risk, credit risk mitigation techniques and 
asset securitization. 
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Appendix F: Risk Approaches of Basel II 
Risk Approaches Explanations 
(I) Credit Risk 
A Standardized 
Approach  
( a modified version of 
the existing approach) 
Changes from Basel I, use of external credit ratings to determine 
risk weights, more risk differentiation to solve the cherry-picking 
problem, more recognition of credit risk mitigate technique to 
solve securitization issue. 
A Foundation Internal 
Rating-Based Approach  
(IRB Approach) 
Use of internal measurement to determine risk weights 
An Advanced IRB 
Approach 
Use PD, LGD, EAD, and M to determine the total capital the 
bank needs 
(II) Market Risk 
A Standardized 
Approach 
Based on Equity risk, Interest rate risk, Currency risk and 
Commodity risk. 
An Internal Models 
Approach Prefer the Value at risk (VaR)  
(III) Operational Risk (roughly 20% of the total capital) 
A Basic Indicator 
Approach Only one indicator, 15 percent of Gross income 
A Standardized 
Approach 
Several indicators, different percentages 12-18% apply to 8 
different business segments (e.g., 15% of gross income in 
commercial banking segment) 
An Internal 
Measurement Approach 
Generated by bank’s own operational risk measurement systems 
(subject to satisfying minimum supervisory standards) 
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Appendix G: Treatment to Company Claims 
 
Credit 
Rating 
AAA to 
AA- A+ to A- 
BBB+ to 
BB- Below BB- Unrated 
Basel I 
risk weight 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Basel II 
risk weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
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Appendix H: Treatment of OECD Country  
 
 
 
OECD Country 
 
Sovereign Rating 
 
BASEL I 
(risk weight) 
 
BASEL II 
(risk weight) 
 
Turkey 
 
B- 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Mexico 
 
BBB+ 
 
0% 
 
50% 
 
Korea 
 
A 
 
0% 
 
20% 
 
Germany 
 
AAA 
 
0% 
 
0% 
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Appendix I: Structure of the Chinese Banking System  
Chinese Banking System 
Central Bank People’s Bank of China 
 
China Banking Regulatory Commission  
China Securities Regulatory Commission  
Regulatory 
Institutions (3) 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission  
 
Agricultural Development Bank of China 
National Development Bank 
 
Policy Banks (3) 
China Import and Export Bank 
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
Bank of China  
China Construction Bank 
Agricultural Bank of China  
 
 
State-owned Commercial 
Banks (5) 
Bank of Communications  
 
China Merchants Bank CITIC Industrial Bank 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Guangdong Development 
Bank 
Industrial Bank Huaxia Bank 
China Minsheng Banking Co. Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
Everbright Bank of China  Evergrowing Bank 
 
 
 
Joint Stock Commercial 
Banks (12) 
China Zheshang Bank China Bohai Bank 
 
City Commercial Banks (112) 
Rural Commercial Banks Foreign Banks 
Urban Credit Cooperatives Postal Savings 
Rural Credit Cooperatives  Non-bank Financial Institutions 
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Appendix J: Requirements to Implement Basel II 
Pillar 1: Capital 
Adequacy Main Features Key Requirements 
Credit Risk 1 
Simplified 
Standardized 
Approach (SSA) 
Greater risk sensitivity than Basel I through 
more risk buckets and risk weights for 
sovereigns and banks based on Export 
Credit Agency (ECA) risk scores. 
Operational risk charge 15 percent of 
annual gross income.  
 
Pillar 2 and 3 are applicable. 
 
Credit Risk 2 
Standardized 
Approach (SA) 
More risk buckets than SSA.  
Risk weights for asset classes based on 
ratings of external credit assessment 
agencies (ECAIs) or ECA scores.  
 
Enhanced credit risk mitigation is available. 
Ratings of ECAIs. 
Ability and capacity to 
qualify rating agencies 
and map agency scores 
Credit Risk 3 
Foundation 
Internal Ratings 
Based Approach 
(F-IRB) 
Risk components: probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at 
default (EAD), and maturity (M). 
Banks can use own PD estimates and 
supervisory estimates for other components. 
 
Stress testing required. 
Ability to assess banks’ 
rating system design. 
Ability to validate 
banks’ risk management 
and stress testing 
systems. 
Ability to provide 
supervisory estimates of 
LGD and EAD 
Credit Risk 4 
Advanced 
Internal Ratings 
Based Approach 
(A-IRB)  
Capital requirements determined as in F-
IRB Banks can use own estimates for PD, 
LGD, EAD and M. 
Subject to supervisory validation of 
systems. 
Stress testing required. 
Ability to assess banks’ 
rating system design. 
 
Ability to validate 
banks’ risk management 
and stress testing 
systems. 
 
Operational 
Risk 1 
Basic Indicator 
Approach 
Flat rate is 15 percent of gross annual 
income. 
 
Operational 
Risk 2 
Standardized 
Approach 
Operational risk charges for each business 
line, based on annual income per business 
line, multiplied by risk factor per business 
line. 
System to distinguish 
business lines and 
supervisory ability for 
validation of this system. 
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Data on operational risk 
occurrences and costs. 
Operational 
Risk 3 
Advanced 
Measurement 
Approach 
Full reliance on banks’ internal risk 
measurement systems, subject to 
supervisory approval. 
Capacity for supervisory 
validation. 
Pillar 2: 
Supervisory 
Review Main Features Key Requirements 
 Banks have a process for assessing capital 
adequacy (CAAP) and a strategy for 
maintaining capital level. Supervisors 
evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
systems and compliance. Higher capital 
adequacy levels for individual banks if risk 
profile requires. Early intervention is by 
supervisors. Stress tests and Assessment of 
interest rate risk and concentration risk. 
Supervisory ability and 
capacity to make the 
necessary assessments. 
 
Adequate legal and 
regulatory framework to 
take action. 
Pillar 3: Market 
discipline Main Features Key Requirements 
 Information to be disclosed includes 
Available capital in the group, capital 
structure, detailed capital requirements for 
credit risk: 
• Breakdown of asset classification 
and provisioning  
• Breakdown of portfolios according 
to risk buckets and risk components  
• Credit risk mitigation (CRM) 
methods and exposure covered by 
CRM  
Operational risk and market risk are 
applicable. 
Banks’ information 
systems to produce 
required breakdowns; 
 
Accounting and auditing 
systems that safeguard 
accuracy of disclosures.  
 
Ability to require 
disclosure, monitor and 
verify.  
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